

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Past and Present*

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Contributors to This Issue

H. SETON-WATSON is a British authority on Russia and Eastern Europe; among his recent books is a history of international Communism, *From Lenin to Malenkov*, 1953.

VALENTINE TSCHEBOTARIOFF BILL is a lecturer in Russian at Princeton University and Adjunct Assistant Professor of History at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, New York University.

FRANK R. BARNETT is a member of the Board of American Friends of Russian Freedom; he was a Rhodes Scholar and served as a military government official on General Clay's staff in Berlin in World War II.

IRAKLI TSERETELLI, a Georgian Menshevik leader, was a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and Minister of Post and Telegraph and of Interior (May-August, 1917) in the Provisional Government.

LUDMILLA B. TURKEVICH is Lecturer in Russian at Princeton University and author of *Cervantes in Russia*, 1950.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE, an authority on Russia and Communism, is the author of *Three Who Made a Revolution*, 1948.

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt

Editor

William Henry Chamberlin

Warren B. Walsh

Michael Karpovich

Alexis Wiren

The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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Soviet Nationality Policy*

· BY H. SETON-WATSON

AT the outset it should be stated that I do not believe that Russia and her problems are unique. They have, of course, their special features, but in many ways they are comparable with other peoples and other lands. I do not believe that Russian nature is something that human reason cannot penetrate. Some Russians will, it is true, contemptuously reject this view. "We are different," they will say. "You will never understand us." Here argument ends. Esoteric revelations and irrational rhetoric are unanswerable. All that one can say with absolute confidence is that there is nothing unique at all in the dogma, "My nation is unique." This attitude is as old as the human race. In our own life-time it was used by Adolf Hitler. In a different setting it was used by Dr. Malan in South Africa. In yet another setting it was used by the Bolsheviki. It is a dangerous dogma, used by dubious people. It makes all human intercourse impossible.

I believe then, that we must look for enlightenment on the problems of any country which we study, whether it is Russia, or Britain, or Abyssinia, not only to the historical documents of the respective country, but also to comparable problems and situations in the experience of other countries. For the problem of Soviet nationality policy I suggest that it is worth looking at the experience of Austria-Hungary and of the small Balkan states, and on the other hand at the British and other European colonial empires. If one can separate those features of Soviet national policy which are characteristic of all multi-national states or colonial empires, from those which are peculiar to the Soviet regime, one will have made some real progress.

Lenin's doctrine on the national question is no doubt so well known that I need spend little time on it. He upheld in principle the right of every nation to self-determination, including the right of secession. At the same time he upheld the international solidarity of the proletariat, and the consequent duty of every working class to prefer the working class of a neighboring nation to the bourgeoisie of its own nation. The contradiction between these two prin-

*This is the English original, with minor modifications, of a lecture delivered by the author, in Russian, in July, 1954 at a conference of scholars at the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the U.S.S.R., Munich, Germany [Ed.].

ciples could not be, and has not been, resolved either in theory or in practice.

Whether, during the stormy years after the October Revolution, any given nationality remained within Soviet Russia or had an independent state of its own, was decided not by theoretical examination of the conflicting principles, but by the geographical position of the respective nationality and by military force. Thus the Poles, Finns, Lithuanians, Letts, and Esthonians established independent states because they were first occupied by the invading German army and then defended by the victorious Western Powers, whose naval might was dominant in the Baltic Sea. The Georgians, Azerbaidjanis, and Armenians had a few years of independence, but they were conquered because Soviet Russia and Turkey had a common interest in their suppression, because they quarrelled with each other, and because they antagonized the Western Powers. The other main nationalities of the Russian Empire, Ukrainians, Volga Tatars, and Central Asians, were inaccessible to western help and were conquered in turn by White and Red armies.

Once the Bolshevik regime was established, its official policy, as we know, was based on the principle of "a culture national in form and socialist in content." In theory, there were two dangers, to be combated with equal energy and vigilance. One was Great Russian Great Power chauvinism, the other, local bourgeois nationalism. In actual fact however, Bolshevik treatment of the nationalities after 1921 was as opportunist as it had been during the Civil War. The most important single fact about the history of Bolshevik nationality policy is that its phases coincide with, and were determined by the phases of Stalin's general policy.

The years of N.E.P. were a period in which, though the Bolsheviks held dictatorial power, they exercised it with relative mildness. This was true not only in the peasant economy but also in religious and cultural life and in nationality policy. During these years some of the nationalities enjoyed a real measure of self-government. In the Ukraine, the official policy of Ukrainization enjoyed true popular support. In Transcaucasia, though the vindictive intrigues of Stalin caused injustice and discontent, at least it was true that power was held by local men. But in the other parts of the Soviet Union conditions were different. After the disgrace of Sultan-Galiev the Volga Tatars lost most of their autonomy. In Central Asia, official Soviet sources show beyond doubt that power was concentrated in the hands of the local Russian minority, and the Asian peoples were

kept in subjection. Occasional interventions by Moscow did not substantially change this state of affairs.

Stalin's second revolution of 1929, with its drive for collectivization of agriculture and rapid industrialization, brought a fundamental change of nationality policy, as of all other departments of policy. Ruthless centralization in the economic field was not compatible with self-government for the nationalities. Economic misery and political oppression created bitter hatred, and in the national areas this inevitably took the form of national hatred. Already, in 1930, Ukrainization was abandoned. The famine of 1932-33 in the Ukraine was followed by the appointment of Postyshev as Second Secretary of the Ukrainian party and Stalin's governor-general in the Ukraine. The massacre of livestock in the Kazakh steppes was followed by the starvation or flight of nearly half the Kazakh nation and the Russification of Kazakhstan.

In the national areas as in Russian lands, the years 1935 and 1936 were a period of relaxation of pressures. But the *Yezhovshchina*, beginning at the end of 1936 and extending till early 1939, hit the nationalities with special severity. In the Ukraine, Postyshev himself was swept away, together with all members of the Ukrainian Politburo and the Ukrainian Sovnarkom, besides hundreds of thousands of lower party and state officials and Ukrainian intellectuals. In North Caucasus and the Transcaucasian republics, Avtorhanov tells us that three to four percent of the population were arrested. In Central Asia, the Uzbek Prime Minister Hodzhaev and First Secretary Ikramov were only the most eminent of tens of thousands of victims. The purge also ravaged the autonomous republics of Tataria, Bashkiria, and Buryat Mongolia.

The war brought not only an understandable exaltation of patriotism in official propaganda, but a rigid identification of patriotism with subservience to the Stalinist totalitarian regime and ruthless punishment as traitors not only of the regime's enemies, but of whole nations regarded as potentially disloyal. To this period belong the genocide of the Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Karachays, and Kalmyks.

The post-war period is marked by the emergence of the Soviet Union as one of the two giant powers of the world, with an imperialist policy affecting every part of the globe. This new phase of Soviet imperialism has required still further blows to the national individuality and national traditions of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. The most striking examples of this phase are the suppression

of the national epics of the Moslem peoples and the falsification of the history of North Caucasians, Kirgiz, Ukrainians, Rumanians of Bessarabia, and other nations. The campaign against "cosmopolitanism" has the same significance. For example, Tadjiks must not show pride in the common culture which they share with Persians; rather they must stress the links between Tadjik and Russian culture.

This brief survey of the past leads to the important question: Is the nationality policy of the Soviet Union to-day one of Russification?

This raises two separate questions. The first is, "Does Russification exist?" The second, "Is Russification the driving force of Soviet nationality policy? Is it the motive of this policy, or only its result, or its instrument?"

The answer to the first question must be "Yes."

There are great differences between different parts of the Soviet Union. In Georgia and Armenia there has hitherto been absolutely no Russification. These republics are ruled exclusively by their own nationals. In the Ukraine and Azerbaidjan the problem is more complicated. On the whole it would seem to me that the Ukraine is ruled by Ukrainians, though the formerly Polish provinces form an exception and though, in general, the Russian resident element in the Ukraine certainly possesses influence out of proportion to its numbers. In Azerbaidjan, the city of Baku has a large Russian population, which no doubt is well represented in the state and party apparatus. But the study of such sources as have been available—admittedly imperfect—suggests that even in Baku most important posts are held by Azerbaidjanis, and that in the rest of the republic this is definitely so.

A special case are certain border provinces. Here there have been massive deportations of local people and massive colonization of Russians. This is true in the Western Ukraine, the Baltic states, and probably Western White Russia. It is also true in Bessarabia. In the Far East the same is true of Sahalin and the Kurile Islands. The motives of these actions are clearly strategic.

But the most important examples of Russification are to be found in the economically developing regions of Asiatic Russia, inhabited by Moslem, Buddhist, or Shamanist nations. Here Russification takes several distinct forms.

Colonization of Russians and Ukrainians affects in the first place the new industrial centers. The capitals of the Central Asian repub-

lics are largely Russian cities—Tashkent rather less so than the others. So are Izhevsk, capital of the Udmurt A.S.S.R.; Ufa—capital of Bashkiria; Ulan Ude—capital of Buryat Mongolia. But in certain areas colonization extends even to the countryside. After the mass starvation in Kazakhstan during collectivization Russian and Ukrainian peasants were brought in. Krushchev's new drive to develop the agriculture of Kazakhstan will take the process further.

To insist that Russian should be taught as a compulsory second language in national schools, does not seem to me to be unreasonable. Every great state must have a first language and in the Soviet Union it is obvious that this must be Russian. Much more dubious is the tendency to make Russian the only language in secondary and higher education in areas of mixed population. The universities of Central Asia, of which Soviet propaganda to Asia makes so much use, have for the most part Russian as the language of instruction and a very large proportion of their students are not Asians but resident Russians. Another element of Russification is the imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet for Asian languages and the systematic introduction into those languages of Russian words, which goes far beyond technical vocabulary in the strict sense.

In recent years we have seen the systematic falsification of the history of the nationalities. In Ukrainian history all links with Moscow are stressed, while links with Poland and with southern or western Europe are minimized. Shamil¹ is represented as a reactionary agent of Anglo-Turkish imperialism. The conquest of Kirgizia by the Tsar's armies is interpreted as a progressive action as it furthered the social development of the Kirgiz nation and brought it into contact with progressive Russian culture. This argument is simply the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist equivalent of the arguments used by the nineteenth century theorists of European and American imperialism. The same tendency can be seen in the suppression of the Moslem national epics—*Dede Korkut* in Azerbaidjan; *Korkut ata* in Turkmenia; *Alpamysh* in Uzbekistan and *Manas* in Kirgizia.

Of the subordination of the republican governments to the Union government there is of course no doubt. It is clear even in the text of the Constitution and it is clearer still if one takes into account

¹Shamil (1797-1871) led the Caucasian tribes in a long war to maintain independence from Russia; defeated and captured in 1859 [Ed.].

the hierarchy of the Communist Party. But here too the problem of Russification arises. In Central Asia the Second Secretaries of the Central Committees of the republican parties and in most cases the Second Secretaries of *oblast* committees are Russians. In Kazakhstan, of course, at present both the First and Second Secretaries are Russians, but this is perhaps due to temporary exceptional circumstances. It is interesting to note that post-war purges in the Central Asian parties appear to have affected Russian Second Secretaries more than Asian First Secretaries. This would seem to show that it is the Second Secretaries who wield the real power. In the case of the Ukraine the problem is not that the Ukrainian party is run by Russians—this does not seem to be the case—but that the Ukraine is extraordinarily under-represented in the leadership of the All-Union party.²

Now comes the second question—"Is Russification the driving force, the motive, of Soviet nationality policy?": It is tempting to argue that Bolshevik policy is a continuation of the Russification policy of Alexander III and Nicholas II. There are some striking similarities. I have already mentioned the imperialistic interpretation of the suppression of Shamil and the Kirgiz. I am myself inclined to the view that the dominant social type which is emerging in the Soviet Union is a kind of bureaucratic state bourgeoisie, whose ideas and general mentality are a curious combination of those of the nineteenth century European capitalist bourgeoisie and the nineteenth century Russian bureaucracy. One might thus argue that there is likely to be a continuity of outlook between Plehve and Khrushchev.

Nevertheless I believe this idea to be wrong. I do not think that the Soviet government is interested in Russian nationalism. The conflict is not between the Russians and the smaller nationalities, but between these nationalities and a centralized totalitarian regime. The regime suppresses the nationalities as it suppresses all groups not created by itself. For the suppression of the nationalities it uses Russians as its instruments. It does this because the Russians are the most numerous, and culturally and economically the most advanced, of the peoples of the Soviet Union and because Russians,

²The All-Union Central Committee has among its full members thirty-six First Secretaries of *obkoms* or *kraikoms* of A.S.S.R.s within the R.S.F.S.R. and another twelve as candidates. Only two First Secretaries of Ukrainian *obkoms* are candidates; none are full members. *Oblasts* of such industrial importance as Kharkov, Stalino, Kiev, and Dnepropetrovsk are not represented.

as Russians, are less likely to be disloyal to the regime. It may well be that individual Russians used by the regime in national areas, act in a contemptuous and chauvinistic manner towards members of other nationalities. The sum total of such arrogant actions may produce a very large volume of indignation. But Russification is not the government's aim.

The government's aim is total power. It intends to exploit every human being, and every economic resource in the country. If there is oil in the territory of Bashkiria or Azerbaidjan—that oil must be made available for the purposes of those who control the totalitarian machine centered in Moscow. If it is to their advantage that Uzbeks and Tadjiks should grow more cotton and less grain, they will be made to do so. When the British ruled Egypt, they developed cotton at the expense of grain and have been severely criticized for doing so. But there are three important differences between British treatment of Egypt and Bolshevik treatment of Turkestan. Firstly, the greater part of the profits of Egyptian cotton growing went to Egyptians, while all the profits of Uzbek cotton *kolkhozy* go to Moscow. Secondly, no British government would ever have considered, or did consider, withholding grain supplies from Egypt to starve its people into submission, whereas this threat was used by the Soviet government. Thirdly, Egyptians could and did bitterly attack not only British cotton policy but British rule itself. For Uzbeks or Tadjiks such criticism would be fatal.

In order to achieve total power over its subjects, the Soviet regime systematically atomizes society. All associations of citizens for whatever purpose must be directed by the Party and infiltrated by the M.V.D. This applies as much to groups of musicians or sportsmen or butterfly-lovers as to political groups. The regime has a special distrust, which, granted its premises, is perfectly just, for any association derived from some principle that is independent of, and older than the regime. The two most important associations of this kind are religious communities and nations. By its very nature the regime is unable to tolerate the existence of either. It is determined to destroy the nationalities, not in the interest of the Russian nation, but because the totality of its power demands it. It will not be content until no Uzbek feels that he is linked to another Uzbek, because he is an Uzbek, by a link stronger than that which binds him to his hierarchical superior in the totalitarian power system.

Soviet policy is a war of extermination against the principle of

nationality. It can also fairly be described as imperialism. But it is not inspired by the desire to russify the nationalities.

It would, however, be quite wrong to deduce from this that Soviet policy does not appear to the nationalities that suffer from it as a policy of deliberate Russification. Thousands of examples can be found to show that oppression whose instruments are people of another nation is felt by its objects to be something different from oppression at the hands of their own compatriots. In the 1930's in Czechoslovakia the German workers of the western border regions suffered heavily from unemployment. This was a result of the world economic depression of that time, but these Germans regarded it as an act of oppression by the Czech government. In Transylvania under the Rumanian king Carol the corruption and brutality of the bureaucracy caused equal suffering to its Rumanian and Hungarian inhabitants. But whereas to the Rumanians this seemed a matter of political or class oppression, the Hungarians felt that they were being victimized as a nation.

In the Soviet Union the famines in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan seemed to their victims to be measures of extermination directed against their nations, though this was not in fact the conscious aim of Stalin.

The attitude of the Moscow government to Islam seems to be especially important. Bolshevik persecution of Orthodoxy was persecution by Russians of Russians. Persecution of Islam is persecution by Russians of Asians. The evidence shows without doubt firstly—that ever since 1917 the number of Communists among the Moslem nations of the Soviet Union has been very small, and secondly—that these Asian Communists have always been most reluctant to attack Islam, even though they personally may have ceased to be believers. The campaigns against Islam have always come from Moscow and their active exponents in the Moslem areas have been the resident Russian elements. Those Asian Communists who have supported the campaign have appeared to the population as mere puppets of the Russians. The attack on Islam in fact has been imposed from outside, by members of another nation with other religious traditions. Such a situation inevitably creates nationalist reaction.

There is a special problem to be considered—the formation of new intelligentsias among the nationalities. It is beyond dispute that the Soviet regime has given the nationalities greater opportunities of education and of careers for their talents than could have been

dreamed of under the Tsars. Ukrainians, Transcaucasians, Tatars, and Central Asians now have hundreds of thousands of university students, teachers, engineers, scientists, and bureaucrats of all sorts. These men owe their careers to the Soviet regime. It is often assumed that they are grateful for this and that they form most loyal and reliable support for the Stalinist regime among their compatriots.

In my view this opinion is quite wrong. In the Kingdom of Hungary before 1914, Slovaks or Serbs or Rumanians who learned the Hungarian language and went to a Hungarian university, could acquire the best education and make good careers. But those who did this, did not become exponents among their own peoples of the Hungarian regime to which they owed their careers. On the contrary, they used their new knowledge and skill to make themselves leaders of the struggle of their peoples for independence from Hungary. The intelligentsia of the Asian nations was created by the opportunities of modern secular education created by the European Powers. Moslems, Confucians, and Buddhists of course had had schools of their own type, with their traditional form of culture, which may have been equal or superior to ours for centuries. But for survival in the modern world, modern secular education is needed. This was imported by the Europeans. The new Asian intelligentsia which arose from study in the schools and universities of the West, or in schools of the western type created in their countries, owed their careers entirely to the Westerners. But this did not make them exponents among their own peoples of western colonial rule. On the contrary, like the intelligentsia of the subject peoples of Hungary, they became leaders of their peoples' struggles for independence. Pandit Nehru was educated at Harrow, one of the best schools in England (which had among its pupils Sir Winston Churchill), and at Cambridge University. Ho-Chi-Minh studied in France, loves French literature and civilization and has had many French friends. The pioneers of the small Communist parties of the Arab lands include many former students of the American University of Beirut.

I do not believe that the same result is not also produced among the intelligentsia of the nationalities of the Soviet Union and especially among the Asian element. It is of course true that there are no independence movements in Central Asia like the Indian National Congress or the Egyptian WAFD or the Tunisian *néo-Destour*. But, as we all know, this proves only that totalitarianism

is different from democracy, that the M.V.D.'s function in Soviet society is different from that of the police in Britain or France. It does not prove that the Central Asian intelligentsia are not thinking in terms of nationalist movements. The campaigns of the Soviet Communist Party against "bourgeois nationalism" with all their fantastic excesses, provide indirect evidence.

In conclusion, a few words about the future. The record of Russian imperialism before 1917 was, it seems to me, neither worse nor better than that of other European imperialism. Bolshevik imperialism is a horrible tyranny, but the Russians are its victims as well as the other nations of the Soviet Union. There are positive elements in the historical relationship between the Russian people and their neighbors, at least in the east and south. Strong arguments can be found in favor of preserving a single great state, reorganized on a genuinely federal principle. But there is no iron law of history that states must be big.

The Nazis loved to declaim about the merits of a "Grossraum," within which the Germans should rule over dozens of smaller client peoples. To adopt their doctrines on behalf of the Russian people would be perilous. Let us put aside all rhetorical phrases and metaphysical dogmas. The economies of the Ukraine and Russia are complementary. They must trade with each other on a massive scale. But this does not prove that there cannot be an independent Ukrainian state. National independence does not need to bring with it tariff barriers and economic boycotts. An independent Georgia would be a very small state. But Switzerland is a small state and has survived although it lies between France, Germany, and Italy, which have often fought wars with each other. Central and South America contain many small states which have survived for a hundred years or more. When Stalinism has ceased to exist—which we may or may not live to see—we must assume that a system of international order and security will be established, within which it will be possible for both small states and large federations to exist.

One thing, however, is absolutely clear. Neither the United States, which has granted independence to the twenty million people of the Philippines, nor Britain, which has granted independence to the four hundred and fifty million people of India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon, can undertake to support a free Russia of the future in preventing Ukrainians or Uzbeks or Georgians or Letts from seeking their own independence. The future of the nationalities of the Soviet Union must depend on their own wishes, freely expressed in a

clear manner. Meanwhile we must regard the question as open and we must do everything to promote real friendship between the Russian people and the other peoples oppressed by the common totalitarian enemy. And I am using the word, not as a piece of rhetoric, but in its exact sense. By "friendship" I mean not imperialism hiding under a mask, but friendship.

The Early Days of Russian Railroads

BY VALENTINE TSCHEBOTARIOFF BILL

THE Crimean War had been fought and lost on the Southern periphery of the Russian Empire, some 1300 miles away from the capital and military headquarters of Petersburg. To bridge the distance and to keep the besieged Crimean stronghold of Sevastopol supplied with reinforcements and provisions, had been a task weighted by stupendous difficulties. During the spring thaws and torrential rains of early summer the steppes of Northern Crimea turned into an impassable sea of mud, over which the horse and ox-drawn supply wagons moved at a speed of one-half mile per hour; requiring over a month to reach Sevastopol from Perekop, which lies at the junction of the Crimean peninsula and the land mass of Southern Russia. And this was only the last lap in the communication line between battlefield and home front. Before reaching Perekop, soldiers, ammunition, food, and medical supplies had already been moved slowly and laboriously over hundreds of miles of overland and river routes. Communication problems played a major part in bringing about Russia's defeat. And after the war was over, the need to improve Russia's transportation system, primarily by supplying the country with a net of railroad lines, became a matter of urgent governmental concern.

Military considerations had brought this problem to the fore and hastened attempts at its solution. But it was in the field of economic progress that railroads were of prime necessity, even though Russia's industrial advance had as yet hardly begun. The distribution of Russia's natural resources and soils, her topography, even her climate were such, that the entire economy stood in crying need of man-made means of communications. Russia's industry could hardly have developed at the spectacular pace it assumed in subsequent decades, had it not been preceded by extensive railroad construction.

The Southern blacksoil steppe belt was Russia's granery and bread basket. The Northern forest belt formed her reservoir of construction material and fuel. For well into the second half of the nineteenth century Russia's stoves, furnaces, and engines were fed

wood rather than coal. The principal connecting links between the two regions and the main avenues of traffic were the rivers. But the largest and most important among them, the Dnieper, the Don, and the Volga, and many of their tributaries, flow in a southerly direction. Food supplies for Central and Northern Russia had thus to be moved upstream, and at the least propitious time of year. Southern crops were harvested in mid-August and ready for shipment by October. Yet in early November the rivers froze and remained ice-bound until May. Frequently large portions of a summer's harvest could not be shipped northward until the following spring. Passenger traffic was equally slow and cumbersome. It took peasants from Central Russia, seeking employment in the Southern fields at harvest time, as long as forty days to reach their destination—twice the time it took European emigrants sailing from London or Liverpool to land on the shores of America.

While the direction of Russia's rivers impeded domestic trade in cereals, it furthered grain exports abroad. For, after wending their way through the grain-producing steppe region, both the Dnieper and the Don flow into the Black Sea, thus pointing the way to the ports dotting the shore line. Long before the Crimean War had proved the pressing need for railroad construction and in spite of prevailing transportation problems, Russia's cereal exports had been fast on the increase. Average yearly exports of wheat trebled during the 1840's as compared to the preceding decade, and almost all of it left Russia through the southern ports of Odessa, Sevastopol, Feodossia, Azov, and Rostov, to name only the largest. Yet, here also the railroads could be expected to bring vast improvements and stimulation. The chief market for Russia's cereal lay in North-western Europe; Great Britain and Prussia, with their rapidly growing industries and urban population, being her largest customers. And if grain shipments could be directed through the Baltic ports of Petersburg, Narva, Riga, and Libau rather than the Black Sea harbors, a great economy in time and transportation costs would ensue. Freight by sea from Odessa to London was twice as expensive as from Petersburg or Riga. Such savings were far from negligible, especially since Russian grain was soon to feel the competition of American and Canadian wheat on the world market.

Russian railroad construction was thus motivated by a great variety of purposes and designs. There was the need to link the forest belt of the North with the black soil belt of the South. There was also the task of connecting the interior Moscow region with the

frontiers, especially the Western and Southern border areas where the majority of Russia's military conflicts had taken place in the past. And, finally, there was the problem of improving Russia's means of communications with Europe by extending the railroad tracks to the ports of the Baltic and the Black Sea. In fact, the pattern of railroad construction bore great similarity to the course Russia's colonization had heretofore followed, reflecting and repeating many a salient thrust of Russian expansion.

From the fourteenth century on, Moscow had served as the central point of a circular expansion of Russia's frontier which advanced in all four directions. To exploit the natural resources of the primeval forests of the North and to build the Arctic port of Archangel as a preliminary window to Europe, to conquer and colonize the fertile reaches of the Southern steppes, to defend the open and often threatened frontier in the West, to build, in Petersburg, a stable and enduring point of contact with Europe, to explore the vast horizons of Siberia, these were among the salient problems facing the Russian people throughout their past history. And these were also among the factors dictating the course and direction of Russia's railroads. Moscow was the hub and center where all great railroad lines would converge like the spokes of a wheel. From here they were to radiate in all four directions, to the South, West, North, and East.

Of these four thrusts, the eastward railroad expansion into Siberia was the last to come and the one to be executed by the government. The other three, however, were carried forth by the efforts and initiative of private individuals. The pioneering entrepreneurs who appeared on the scene of Russian railroad construction in the 1860's were not few to begin with and increased in numbers in the subsequent decade. Four among them stand out as the leading figures in achievement and success. The chief initiators of the southward railroad construction were Pavel Grigorievich von Derviz and Samuel Solomonovich Poliakov. A leading part in the westward railroad building was played by Ivan Stanislavich Bliokh, while the northern railroad, linking Moscow to Archangel, was the work of Savva Ivanovich Mamontov. With the exception of the last, the names of these men are all but forgotten. Yet they deserve to be remembered and to be given a place in the annals of the Russian bourgeoisie. For they, their partners, collaborators, and lesser competitors laid the groundwork for an industrial expansion which was to gather such speed during the last two decades of the century

as to surpass the contemporary rate of European and even American advance.

The appearance of these individual entrepreneurs in Russia's economic arena was in itself a noteworthy novelty. For centuries past, the energies and productive efforts of the Russian people had been manipulated and directed by the state, leaving little room for the development of private initiative and enterprise. A series of significant developments combined to bring about a change in the government's attitude. In the first place, the 1860's were an era of reform, which saw serfdom and many allied, antiquated institutions fall. No word was probably repeated as frequently, as hopefully, and among as many different social strata of Russian society as the word Freedom at the time of the Emancipation. Moreover, Europe's economy was in many ways Russia's model and source of inspiration, and European railroad building had been successfully started by private companies. Finally, the finances of the Russian government were in a strained condition after the Crimean War, leaving insufficient funds for such costly undertakings as the construction of railroads. These were some of the general reasons for the state officials' more benevolent attitude toward the question of private ventures.

There were, in addition, certain specific experiences of the government in the field of railroad construction itself, which led the officials to the conclusion that an appeal to private Russian initiative and resources was indicated. By the time of the Emancipation in 1861, two sources of capital had already been tapped for the construction of railroads and both met with paralyzing difficulties. One was state funds, the other, foreign capital.

Several years before the outbreak of the Crimean War, the Russian government had undertaken to link the two capitals of Petersburg and Moscow by rail. This road was built with great care and thoroughness and its solid and luxurious equipment could successfully compete with the best contemporary European railroads. It was the pride of all officials connected with its operation. The Director of Communications, Count P. A. Kleinmichel, had a special study built for his use in the station at Petersburg. When he personally attended the departure of the daily mail train for Moscow, he took off his hat and drew to attention. The same reverent pose was expected from everyone else present on the platform.¹

¹A. I. Shtukenberg, "Iz istorii zhelesnodorozhnogo dela v Rossii," *Russkaya Starina*, 1886, Vol. 49, p. 97.

But the cost of this railroad had been stupendous; 150,000 roubles for each of the 400 miles separating the two capitals. After the Crimean War, the government could not afford similar investments and turned to foreign financiers. In 1857 French, English, Dutch, and Polish banking houses founded the Chief Company of Russian Railroads. The plans of the Company were grandiose and anticipated the establishment of rail connections between Moscow and points East (Nizhni Novgorod), West (through Petersburg, Warsaw, and on to the Austrian frontier) and South (through the black soil belt to the Black Sea port of Feodossia). A line from the black soil belt to the Baltic Sea port of Libau was also planned. The managerial and technical personnel of the Company consisted almost exclusively of foreigners and to them the problems in dealing with the unfamiliar conditions of Russian life proved too much for a successful realization of all of the Company's plans. Recruiting the necessary labor force proved particularly difficult, for in those early days of railroad building the Russian peasants viewed the *Chugunka* as they called the Iron Horse, with great fear and distrust. They believed that the devil had been captured and encased in the steam engine where he was set to work relentlessly propelling the train. The construction engineer, A. I. Shtukenberg, recounts observing three old peasant women executing a wild dance near a railroad crossing, throwing their skirts high into the air, so as to scare the devil imprisoned in the engine and to prevent him from escaping and invading their homes.

The Company succeeded in building the connection between Moscow and Nizhni Novgorod, and the Western line leading from Petersburg to Warsaw and the Austrian frontier, but at far greater cost than anticipated. In 1861 it abandoned plans for the construction of the lines which were to link the inland with the Baltic and the Black Sea. It was then that the Russian government turned to Russian entrepreneurs, offering them concessions for the construction of projected lines. To encourage prospective railroad builders, the government eased the previously established rules for fund raising and allowed three fourths of the needed capital to be subscribed in bonds and only one fourth in shares. Moreover, the government guaranteed a minimum profit of five percent on the investment.

Speculative transactions had always flourished in the realm of railroading, since it was well nigh impossible to estimate accurately the profitability of a projected line. In the early 1860's investors'

opinion of Russian railroad ventures was low, both at home and abroad, due to the stalled operations of the Chief Company of Russian Railroads. It fell to Pavel Grigorievich von Derviz to bring about a radical change in this situation and to restore confidence among financial circles in the soundness of Russian railroad stocks and bonds.

Von Derviz was a native of Tambov province, in the heart of the black soil region. He had graduated with honors from the Imperial Law School in Petersburg. During the Crimean campaign he had worked in the Supply Department of the Ministry of War. It is likely that his interest in railroads stemmed from this experience, from observing at close range the disastrous difficulties in communications between Sevastopol and the home front. It was only natural that his railroad interest should then turn to opening up the black soil region, of which he was a native.

Through the influence of his schoolmate, Count Mikhail Reiter, who became Minister of Finance in 1862, von Derviz received a concession for the construction of a railroad from Moscow to Kozlov, largest grain trading post in Tambov province. He financed his railroad by selling bonds to small German investors rather than by setting his financial proposals before large-scale bankers, whose memory of the difficulties experienced by the Chief Company of Russian Railroads might be too fresh for a favorable response. The technical end of the business was placed in the hands of an able engineer, K. F. von Meck. In 1866 the railroad made its first run. A year later, it was operating with a net profit of twelve percent. The line represented the first, and, so far, only link between the grain-producing region and Moscow, and beyond that, with a Baltic port, Petersburg, since rail communication between the two capitals was already established.

Overnight, von Derviz found himself a rich man worth several million roubles. In 1868 he decided to devote the rest of his life—he was then forty-two—to the enjoyment of his wealth. He withdrew from business, went abroad, built a palace in Nice and lived a life of leisure, luxury, and dissipation. His twenty-fifth wedding anniversary was celebrated in a manner so fantastic as to be difficult to believe, had it been recorded by a lesser authority than Count Sergei I. Witte. Witte tells in his memoirs² that von Derviz gave a large party for the occasion, in the course of which his wife was

²Count Sergei I. Witte, *Vospominaniya, 1849-1894*, Berlin, 1923, p. 108.

solemnly presented with a large tray upon which were stacked one million roubles in gold. Whereupon von Derviz addressed his wife, thanking her for her past devotion and faithfulness, but asking her to leave him, since he was no longer in need of her. It is tempting to speculate how the creative genius of Dostoevsky might have immortalized this scene.

In contrast to the meteoric flash of von Derviz, Samuel Solomonovich Poliakov devoted all of his life to hard and persistent work, continuing the construction of railroads in the direction indicated by von Derviz. He was the son of destitute Jewish parents, born near the small town of Orsha in the marshy, desolate Western province of Mogilev. This region had not been detached from Poland and annexed by Russia until the later half of the eighteenth century and a large percentage of the population in the area was still Jewish, engaged in petty trade and handiwork. Poliakov thus lacked the educational advantages and the social connections which von Derviz had been fortunate to possess. But he compensated for this drawback with astuteness, drive, and vitality.

Circumstances brought Poliakov to the black soil province of Kharkov, where he succeeded in securing a modest job as a post office employee. It was here that his intelligent and energetic bearing attracted the attention of Count Ivan Matveevich Tolstoy who was then Minister of Post. Tolstoy took Poliakov under his wing and helped him get started on his spectacular railroad career.³ In 1867, Poliakov set out to continue the penetration of the black soil region which von Derviz had brought as far as the grain-trading town of Kozlov. By 1871 Poliakov had completed two parallel railroad lines bisecting the black soil region in a southerly direction and terminating at two southern seaports. From Kozlov the tracks ran to Voronezh and on to the port of Rostov. From Kursk rails stretched over Kharkov to the port of Azov.

The distance between Kursk and Azov is roughly the same as between Petersburg and Moscow; that between Kozlov and Rostov, slightly longer. Yet it took Poliakov only four years to build both roads, while the government had spent eight years in constructing the rail connection between the two capitals. His construction costs compared favorably with the money spent by the government on the Petersburg-Moscow road. They averaged 75,000 roubles per mile or one third of the corresponding governmental

³Later, Poliakov named a station on his railroad "Grafskaya" in grateful memory of Tolstoy's support.

expenditure. And this, regardless of the difficulties in terrain, which at places required extensive earthworks, construction of numerous bridges, and the employment of thousands of workmen.

His financial rewards were commensurate with these achievements and by far surpassed the wealth accumulated so rapidly by his predecessor von Derviz. Poliakov gave a good portion of his fortune for educational and charitable purposes. The total amount of contributions made during his life time is estimated at between two and three million roubles.⁴ Providing educational facilities for the youth of back country areas seems to have been one of his great and early concerns. At the very beginning of his railroad career, in 1867, Poliakov founded a high school and a technical school for railroad personnel in the district town of Elets, province of Orel. To finance such ventures at the very start of his railroad enterprises must not have been easy, but Poliakov devised a plan. Each year, about 23 roubles for each mile of road operating under his management were withdrawn from the profits and assigned to a special school fund.

Not all of Poliakov's enterprises lay in the South. There is one in the North which deserves to be mentioned because it bears witness to the farsighted and imaginative sweep of his mind. Poliakov purchased the stock of the suburban Tsarskoe Selo Railroad linking the Imperial Summer residence with Petersburg. For years, the road had been operating at a loss. Poliakov intended to remedy the situation by building cheap apartment houses along the tracks and encouraging the working population of Petersburg to move to a healthier and more attractive setting outside the city limits. Well over fifty years were to pass before this idea of decentralizing the working population of large cities began to be put into effect in the West.

Death put a premature end to these plans and to Poliakov's career. In April, 1888, he was in Petersburg, attending the funeral of a friend, the railway magnate, Abraham Moiseevich Warshavsky. Warshavsky was a native of the Ukrainian town of Poltava, where stories of his generosity had grown into a myth. The Jewish newspaper, *Voskhod*, stated in its obituary that the misfortune of having no money was proverbially commented upon in Poltava as being only temporary. All one had to do to insure receipt of funds was to write to Warshavsky.⁵ As the funeral procession for this generous

⁴*Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar*, Petersburg, 1905, Vol. 14, p. 485.

⁵*Nedel'naiya Khronika Voskhoda*, Petersburg, 1888, No. 15.

and free-giving man reached the street, Poliakov, who was walking close behind the coffin, suddenly faltered in his steps and collapsed. The Court physician, Sergei P. Botkin, was summoned, but could only diagnose a fatal heart attack. Poliakov was fifty-two. The funeral oration over Poliakov's grave was given by his brother-in-law Baron G. O. Ginsburg, who lamented the death of "a man with a keen mind" at the bier of a "man with a big heart."⁶ Poliakov's fortune did not long survive its founder. It was spent by his easy-going and, according to Count Witte, dissolute and arrogant son.⁷

Von Derviz had devoted only a few years to railroads; Poliakov had given all his life. Ivan Stanislavich Bliokh took a middle course and spent twenty years in the field of railroad building. Like Poliakov, he came of a poor Jewish family, but unlike him, was concerned with improving his own intellect before spending money on providing educational opportunities for other people. He began his career as a railroad contractor recruiting workmen for the construction of the Kiev-Warsaw Railroad. After accumulating a certain amount of savings, he withdrew from business and went abroad to study and attend lectures at some of the leading German universities. Upon his return to Russia, he took part in the construction of the Libau-Romny Railroad. In 1871, the concession for this road had been given to K. F. von Meck, the engineer who had previously collaborated so successfully with von Derviz in the South. With the construction of the Libau-Romny Railroad, the last of the projects formerly abandoned by the Chief Company of Russian Railroads was realized. The Baltic port of Libau was linked, through 650 miles of track, with the Western, Ukrainian sector of the black soil region.

Bliokh invested his profits in the purchase of bonds and stocks of three separate railroads recently constructed in the Western sector of the country. One ran from the Black Sea port of Odessa to Kiev, the other from Kiev to Brest, and the third from Brest to the East Prussian frontier at Graevo. Bliokh merged these three lines into the Company of Southwestern Railroads and appointed himself president. He was now in control of the chief rail communications in the Western region of Russia. The lines operated by the company extended over a total length of 2,000 miles. Two of Bliokh's employees later became Finance Ministers of Russia. Ivan A.

⁶*Ibid.*, No. 16.

⁷Sergei I. Witte, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.

Vyshnegradsky was Vice-President and representative of the Southwestern in Petersburg, while Sergei I. Witte was Director of the Company before entering governmental service.

The presidency of the Southwestern represents the peak in Bliokh's railroad career. He then turned more and more from business to scholarly pursuits. His main achievement in this field was the publication of a large, five-volume work, *The Influence of Railroads on the Economic Life of Russia*. Bliokh deplored the fact that the compilation and interpretation of statistics was a relatively neglected art in Russia, and illustrated his work with a profusion of colorful and carefully prepared maps, charts, and tables. To this day, this material is a highly interesting source of information on the early days of Russian railroads.

Witte claims that none of Bliokh's writing was done by himself and that he depended exclusively on ghost writers.⁸ Yet, some of the topics discussed under Bliokh's name are startlingly novel and ahead of the times. And since even Witte admits that the choice of subject matter was usually his own, Bliokh deserves to be given credit for this perspicacity. In 1893 an article appeared under his name: "The War of the Future; Its Economic Reasons and Consequences,"⁹ in which a huge increase in armies fighting on the front was predicted. "Whole nations will appear on the battlefield" and be drawn into the bloodiest holocaust of all time. The article passed unnoticed. Its main theme was taken up some ten years later by Winston Churchill in his prophetic speech on the same subject before the British Parliament.

Bliokh devoted the rest of his life to the promotion of the idea of world peace. He succeeded in obtaining an interview with the young Empress Alexandra shortly after Nicholas II's accession to the throne, trying to win her interest and secure her influence in the matter. But he received a very cool and disappointing reception. Bliokh died in 1901, in the midst of planning his latest project—opening a Museum of Peace in Switzerland.

Savva Ivanovich Mamontov, born in 1841, was the only one among the four railroad magnates who was already a rich man when he came into railroad construction. His grandfather and father had amassed a fortune in the liquor business. Taxes levied from liquor sales constituted an important source of state income in those days. In 1859 they supplied forty percent of total governmental revenue.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁹*Russkii Vestnik*, Vol. 224, No. 2, pp. 181-217.

But the government was not the only beneficiary from these levies. The system of liquor tax collection, prevalent until the Emancipation, was such as to offer lucrative sources of income to private individuals as well. The government leased the right to operate taverns, to sell liquor, and to collect the tax, to private individuals, for which privilege it was paid a set sum. This set lease price constituted the government's share in the liquor tax revenue. Whatever the lessees collected in their locale from tavern patrons and vodka buyers was theirs. It is estimated that during the last decade this system was in operation, the annual income of liquor tax lessees amounted to a total sum of 600 to 780 million rubles.¹⁰ One of the men sharing in this bonanza was Savva's father, Ivan Fedorovich Mamontov.

Savva was a man of extraordinary breadth and versatility. His talents and interests were divided between art and business and it is difficult to say in which of these two fields his achievements ranked first. He loved music and spent several years of study in Italy, training his beautiful baritone voice. In 1885 he founded a private opera company in Moscow. He was also a fair sculptor and a gifted stage manager and playwright. His summer residence, Abramtsevo, near Moscow, became the meeting place of the leading painters, sculptors, and musicians of his day. The murals in the Abramtsevo chapel were painted by some of his artist friends—Ilia Repin, V. M. Vasnetsov, and V. D. Polenov.

It was largely due to Mamontov's unerring artistic perspicacity and energetic support that the initially rejected paintings of Mikhail Vrubel finally gained recognition and general acclaim.

Equally significant was Mamontov's role in the fabulous career of Fedor Shaliapin. When the two met in 1896, Shaliapin was an obscure member of the artistic staff of the Imperial Theatres in Petersburg, drawing a modest salary of two hundred rubles a month. Mamontov trebled this sum while offering Shaliapin a position in his private opera company, and, moreover, agreed to bear the brunt of the fine for breaking the contract with the Imperial Theatres. The circle of artists in Mamontov's house proved a great source of stimulation and inspiration for Shaliapin. He was struck by "the adroitness with which the painters could seize on a bit of real life" and henceforth he himself endeavored to be "expressive and plastic."¹¹ When, three years later, Shaliapin left Mamontov's

¹⁰Peter I. Lyashchenko, *History of the National Economy of Russia*, New York, 1949, p. 411.

¹¹Fedor I. Shaliapin, *Pages from My Life*, New York, 1927, p. 185.

opera company to return to the Imperial Theatres, his success and world wide recognition were assured. In his memoirs he speaks of his benefactor with great warmth and gratitude.

To his business ventures Mamontov brought the same enthusiasm, imagination, and farsightedness which characterized his approach to art. Being an artist as well as a business man, Mamontov was drawn to a region in Russia which offered great economic challenges and promise and, at the same time, harbored ancient poetic relics, monuments, and memories of Russia's distant past. This region was the North, the vast expanses of bleak, austere, primeval forests which stretched from the Upper Volga to the White Sea. The deforestation which was progressing at an alarming pace in some districts of Central Russia greatly increased the importance of the Northern timber resources for the entire Russian economy.

When still in his twenties, Mamontov entered the employ of the Moscow-Yaroslavl Railroad Company and soon rose to be Chairman of the Board of Directors. Although Yaroslavl, on the Upper Volga, touches only on the fringes of the Northern timber region, the railroad operated successfully from the start, bringing a net profit of nine percent as early as 1867. From Yaroslavl Mamontov pushed the penetration of the forest region northward to Vologda and on to the White Sea port of Archangel, a feat which was accomplished in 1898. The Yaroslavl Railroad station in Moscow was decorated with murals of the Far North executed by the painter Konstantin Korovin, who, at Mamontov's suggestion, had made a special trip to Archangel. Mamontov maintained that "the eye of the people must be trained to see beauty everywhere—in streets and railroad stations." The murals were exhibited and greatly admired at the 1900 World Fair in Paris.

A large percentage of railroad equipment in Russia had to be imported from abroad. Mamontov decided to lessen this foreign dependence by endeavoring to stimulate domestic production of railroad material. He purchased the Nevski Mechanical Works in Petersburg which manufactured railroad engines, and, moreover, embarked upon the organization of a new railroad car building factory.

Costly as these new ventures were, Mamontov's projects did not stop there. He also planned a new railroad line from Petersburg to Viatka, crossing the Northern timber region in a West to East direction and meeting the South-to-North tracks between Moscow and

Archangel at Vologda. The concession for this new road was given to Mamontov by the Director of the Department of Railroads, Maximov, in 1899. The Moscow-Yaroslavl Railroad stood on the eve of a thorough reorganization into a vast enterprise of Northern Railroads, when disaster struck. It was touched off by the rumor that Mamontov had bribed Maximov in order to receive the concession.

However, the deeper reason for the disaster lay in the fact that Mamontov's financial resources, substantial as they were, lagged behind the scope of his projects. The Moscow-Archangel Railroad was bringing large profits. But Mamontov's railroad factories in Petersburg operated at a deficit. Since Mamontov was Chairman of the Board of Directors of the railroad and the chief shareholder of the factories, he subsidized these plants out of railroad funds, paying in advance for railway equipment yet to be delivered. Construction of the projected Petersburg-Viatka tracks made further heavy demands on Mamontov's financial resources. When he approached Finance Minister Witte with a request for a governmental loan, the application was refused.

Mamontov again turned to the coffers of the Moscow-Archangel Railroad and took out a loan which, this time, exceeded the legally established limits of withdrawals. The matter came to the knowledge of the Minister of Justice, N. V. Muraviev, who had also heard the rumor that the head of the Department of Railroads, Maximov, an appointee of Witte's, had been bribed by Mamontov. Muraviev greatly disliked Witte and hoped to incriminate him through a public investigation of Mamontov's affairs. The government Controller, Tertius I. Filipov, was happy to oblige Muraviev with a governmental investigation of Mamontov's enterprises, for Filipov bore an old grudge against Mamontov, who had once refused to let Shaliapin sing at a concert which the former was sponsoring.

In the fall of 1899, Mamontov was arrested and put in jail, awaiting trial for the embezzlement of funds of the Moscow-Archangel Railroad. From his prison cell, Mamontov wrote to his friend, the artist, V. D. Polenov: "I never understood so clearly the full meaning of art as I do now." In the long ensuing months of confinement, Mamontov wrote the script for an opera "The Necklace" dealing with the times of the Greek colonies in Italy, and translated the libretto of Mozart's *Don Juan* into Russian. He also sculptured miniature busts of his jail keepers, which Konstantin Stanislavsky

found neatly drawn up, as if staging a parade, when he came to visit his unfortunate friend.

The trial took place in the Moscow District Court House in July, 1900. It was established that Mamontov had not spent any of the withdrawn funds for his personal use. When the verdict of not guilty was pronounced, the court room shook with applause.¹² In the meantime, though, Mamontov's creditors had demanded a public auction of his private possessions. His house and all its art treasures, paintings, sculptures, furniture, and rugs were gone. The Moscow-Yaroslavl Railroad had been acquired by the government. Mamontov spent the remaining eighteen years of his life operating a small pottery workshop in Moscow. But he was seldom alone. The workshop became the meeting place of the leading painters, sculptors, actors, and musicians of the day.

Savva Ivanovich Mamontov was the last private railroad magnate to appear in Russia. The 1880's and the latter part of the 1890's, which marked the time of his most intensive railroad and business activity, was also the time during which the government was revising its attitude toward privately owned and operated railroads. The disaster which befell Mamontov might never have happened twenty-five years earlier, when the government was still eager to encourage and support private railroad ventures. The reasons for the change in the government's policy were several.

Alexander II, the liberal Tsar Emancipator, had been assassinated in 1881, and the need to strengthen the power of the state and to reinforce the principle of autocracy, was unequivocally formulated both by Alexander III and Nicholas II. Under Alexander III the systematic purchase of private railroads was begun by the government, for the Tsar had declared the existence of "Railroad kingdoms ruled by little railroad sovereigns" as incompatible with the dignity and security of the Russian autocratic empire.¹³ This policy found an ardent supporter and able executioner in Count Witte, who saw the exigencies of an industrial state more clearly than the problems of an industrial society.

It was largely due to Witte's skill and statesmanship that Russia's finances were in a far more solvent condition than they had been after the Crimean War. Now the Russian government not only had funds to purchase already-functioning railroads, but also could

¹²Paul Bouryshkine, *Moskva Kupecheskaya*, New York, 1954, p. 173.

¹³Sergei I. Witte, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

contemplate the construction of such new lines as the Trans-Siberian, and lay the strategically desirable but economically less lucrative double tracks in the Western section of the country.

Thirty-some years separated the first appearance of railroad tracks in the black soil region to their penetration of the Northern reaches of Archangel. During these three decades Russia's leading railroad entrepreneurs covered much ground, not only in railroad mileage, but in individual growth and stature. They had travelled a long way, from the coarse eccentricities of von Derviz, to the practical common sense and philanthropies of Poliakov, to the scholarly and political pursuits of Bliokh, and ending with the artistic contributions and achievements of Mamontov. This was the end of the road for individual initiative. Beyond stretched a state preserve.

America's Strategic Weakness—Redefection

BY FRANK R. BARNETT

NOT every wind that blows from Moscow carries tidings of peaceful coexistence. There is disquieting (and all too concrete) evidence that the Kremlin is again exploiting an armistice—this time to eliminate two of the most damaging flaws in its apparatus of power. Both weaknesses were clearly revealed in the course of World War II. Left unrepaired, either could inhibit the new freedom of movement which Communist diplomacy is at times seeking for its subterranean and unorthodox machinery of total politics.

To the eye of technology, the obvious deficiencies in Soviet capacity to wage war against America have been, for a precarious interlude, airpower and atomic energy. Informed estimates vary as to when that interlude terminates in a point-of-no-return for world civilization; but even the layman can comprehend the fearful equality in the mathematics of the megaton. The difference between, say, 500 and 10 atomic bombs represents a strategic significance; while the relation of 5,000 hydrogen bombs to 2,000 weapons of similar calibre is probably academic, provided that efficient means of delivery are available to the custodians of both stockpiles.

It is self-evident, therefore, that one of the post-war priorities of Soviet strategy has been to seek to command, or at least neutralize, the seas of air which, by 1945, were the unchallengeable domain of the Anglo-American skyfleets. How well Russian technocracy may have fulfilled that task was dramatized recently by the startling parade of jet bombers over Moscow, a spectacle which recalled the convincing performance of the MIG in Korea. Only experts can debate the present status of the competition for over-all air supremacy, but the public facts offer compelling reasons to abandon the dangerous illusion that the mystic Slavic soul is somehow incapable of brilliant technical achievement.

Within the near future Soviet science will have perfected a murderous air arm to supplement Moscow's traditional military and irregular psycho-social weapons systems. Can we even be sure that Russian technology, relentlessly channeled and underpinned by

industrial espionage, cannot soon develop an electronic missile as accurate as any device fashioned in workshops where demands for consumer goods compete successfully with military imperatives? Whatever the specifics of the answer, it is virtually certain that Communist military mentality will not be satisfied until Soviet vulnerability in the field of air-atomic power has been thoroughly shielded.

If complacency about American air supremacy is not justified, it is equally disturbing to contemplate the skill and persistence with which the Khrushchev coalition is shoring up the other major fissure in the Kremlin wall: the recurrent tendency of the Russian people to seize every feasible opportunity to repudiate Communist suzerainty. The Vlasov story requires no retelling here. It is sufficient to point out that what transpired in Korea reemphasized the lesson that should have been plain after the voluntary mass surrenders of Red Army men to the Germans; namely, that it is almost impossible for the Communists to impose the rigidity of their police state on the flux of war, provided, of course, that their opponents do not commit atrocities or moral blunders which enable the Kremlin to regain control of reluctant armies in the field.

Since it is entirely possible that the fear of "massive defection" has always exercised as much veto power over Communist aggression as the concept of "massive retaliation," it is not surprising that the Kremlin is now moving with dispatch and ingenuity to cover its other Achilles Heel. In the long run, the psychological repercussions stemming from the present systematic and scientific effort to encourage the *redefection* of Russian fugitives may entail almost as much peril to the West as the achievement of Soviet thermonuclear parity. Unfortunately, most citizens in the free world—and especially Americans—find it difficult to cope with nuclear politics, one of whose components is the sociological offensive designated by the cumbersome and alien term "redefection."

That word, however, is filled with ominous portent. Careful analysis suggests that Soviet success with this stratagem is really the *sine qua non* for further aggression.

If Moscow desired meaningful peace, there would seem to be no rationale for the urgency with which her agents are now scouring Western Germany to encourage the "voluntary return" of Soviet escapees. If Moscow were genuinely dedicated to increasing mutual confidence by gradually removing the barriers to the free exchange of goods, ideas and persons, there would be little need for a Com-

munist Ministry of Redefection, and still less for continuing political kidnapping. Only a conspiracy with plans still to hide, a military junta which dares not relax discipline in the restive ranks, or a desperate priesthood which must stamp out spreading heresy—only the immutable Kremlin, in short, would find it mandatory to create a formidable bureaucratic machine for the sole purpose of recapturing Soviet citizens who can supply the West with first-hand intelligence of the Socialist motherland.

The glare of optimism, reflected from the Summit last summer, will not long obscure the pitiless advance of a relatively new piece on the Soviet cold war chessboard: the "Committee for Return to the Homeland," recently established in the Communist-controlled Eastern Zone of Germany, whose purpose is to lure fugitives back behind the Curtain. To the extent that this "spontaneous" Committee (allegedly comprised of repentant refugees) is able to accomplish its mission, the Soviet leaders will be relatively free to indulge once more in the carefully calculated risks of twilight conflict, proof against psychological reprisal.

The work of the Committee for Return to the Homeland represents a sophisticated variation on the methodology of terror continuously employed by the MVD inside the exile community. In the past, the Russian exile has always been demoralized by constant dread of the agent provocateur, the slanderer, the official kidnapper or even professional assassin. Today, old-fashioned prophylactic brutality—*pour décourager les autres*—is supplemented with a shrewd appeal to motivations other than fear: loneliness, love of native land, memories of friends and families left behind, the pathetic hope for forgiveness, despair born of the wretched reception so many have encountered in the West.

Soviet escapees in West Germany and Austria are being inundated with personal letters from the Committee on Return, mailed to their current addresses and filled with intimate details of their private lives. Even those least susceptible to Communist blandishments are naturally alarmed by this striking display of the omniscience of Soviet intelligence. Many of these exiles had gone underground long ago to escape forcible repatriation to the U.S.S.R. at the hands of the Western Allies. For years, others have been living under assumed names and borrowed nationalities in the hope of shielding their families in the Soviet Union. Now letters from relatives at home, obviously inspired by the secret police, and even visits from soft-voiced agents of the Committee are spreading

confusion, panic and despondency through the refugee camps of West Germany.

Unfortunately, the Communist Ministry of Redefection has strong allies on our side of the Curtain: the stench and squalor of the camps; the corroding disappointment of men whose political passions and idealism have been smothered by the doctrines of neutralism and *modus vivendi*; the unbridgeable gulf between the free world's complacent disbelief and the horror in the minds of those who, having fled the outskirts of hell, find no ear that gives credence to their nightmare.

Stout weapons that might have been used in the defense of freedom have rusted in the backwaters of Germany. The grand adventure of escape to the West—with death as the price of failure—has ended only in an abandoned freight car or the basement of a bomb-racked building. Those who chose freedom have found neither the decent living standards of the Western world nor any spiritual nourishment. Those who sought freedom for themselves primarily to work for the eventual liberation of their native land have concluded that they risked their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor for nothing. They are stateless; they are friendless; they are jobless; they are “useless” to themselves, to the West, and to Mother Russia whom they still love.

In such a psychological climate, it is not difficult to understand why the Committee for Redefection is turning the traffic of Soviet citizens through the Iron Curtain in the wrong direction. A recent issue of a special newspaper published by the Committee reads in part: “Fellow-countrymen living abroad! Who needs you there? And if you are needed, it is only to use you either for the hardest physical labor or dishonest work, and then discard you as a useless rag without gratitude. Return! Our Homeland will accept you!” When this appeal falls on minds deadened by misery, it is surprisingly successful considering that few of the escapees actually believe they will be received as prodigals in the U.S.S.R. Expecting (even defying) the worst, they go home. To an American this behavior may seem neurotically suicidal. To a Russian in Germany, whose future—like nine years of his past—lies in the black market and a bleak caserne, a Soviet bullet may be preferable to continuing moral disintegration in an alien land.

This is the scope of a problem which the West only slightly comprehends. Indeed it has been largely left to a private committee of U. S. citizens, the American Friends of Russian Freedom, to make

even a tentative start at a solution. The Honorary Chairman of this Committee is Admiral William H. Standley, wartime Ambassador to the Soviet Union; and the President is the Hon. Felix Cole, retired foreign service officer. Other prominent members of A.F.R.F. are the Hon. Spruille Braden, Gen. William J. Donovan, Eugene Lyons, James F. O'Neill, Gen. Frank L. Howley, the Hon. Arthur Bliss Lane, and Mrs. Ivan Tolstoy. Incorporated in 1951, A.F.R.F. has a small office at 270 Park Ave., New York City. Almost all of its inadequate resources are immediately rushed overseas to meet the urgent needs of Russian escapees. This means that the administrative, educational, and fund-raising responsibilities of the organization fall chiefly on volunteer and part-time shoulders. The purpose of the group is to furnish moral and material aid to Russian victims of Communism and, at the same time, to educate the American people to the distinction between the Soviet peoples and the Communist Party.

Since November of 1951, A.F.R.F. has operated a Friendship House in Munich, the first reception center in West Germany exclusively for the use of escapees from the Soviet Union. Activities in a new and larger hostel include: language classes in German, English, and Portuguese; chess, ping pong, motion pictures, and a library of Russian, English, and German books; legal counseling and, of course, hot meals, not only for residents but transients en route to some technical training center or to A.F.R.F.'s center at Kaiserslautern for job placement with U. S. Army installations in that area.

The "Russian Freedom House" at Kaiserslautern represents a positive effort to integrate Russian escapees into the German economy, to give hopeless men a sense of dignity and a chance to reassume economic and moral responsibilities. Long and patient negotiations with American and German authorities established a precedent for guaranteeing steady employment to a certain number of qualified and carefully screened Russians. The agreement, however, was contingent upon A.F.R.F.'s willingness to provide living quarters for Soviet workers. This was accomplished in 1953, and today a few score Russians have been rescued from Germany's skid row, housed in attractive quarters and assigned jobs that enable them to provide for their families.

A similar project is underway in the highly industrialized Ruhr, on the outskirts of Solingen. A.F.R.F., with enthusiastic cooperation from the Bonn Government and officials of the United States

Escapee Program, has secured a spacious home with ten acres of land where escapees can be lodged. The *Arbeitsamt* has promised to employ 600 Soviet refugees in this area where, incidentally, wage scales are the highest in Germany. Unskilled Russian workers will be trained as apprentices until they are ready for better jobs.

Although A.F.R.F., like other accredited welfare agencies, is supported in part by the United States Escapee Program and registered with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid of the Department of State, it is in every sense a private committee. This circumstance gives A.F.R.F. financial disabilities but spiritual assets in its approach to the Russian escapee who, belabored by propaganda from the Committee for Return and insecure in his role of defector, reacts strongly to any implication that he is being "bought as a lackey of American intelligence." That private citizens of a foreign land should care about him (and ask nothing in return) at first alerts, then confuses, but finally overwhelms the Russian escapee.

Here is a typical letter from a family whose Christmas in 1954 was made a little less drab by the generosity of Americans who sent toys to their children and a little money. Proudly written in laborious English, this poignant note reads exactly as it was composed by a young Soviet mother and father:

Dear American Friends: We received from you 30 dollars and can't find enough words to express you our deep gratitude for your kindness and care. Your dear help came to us in our most difficult time, when we live in the hard want. We both are unemployed more than two years and here in Germany we can't get a job, in spite of all our attempts. We got in this month a baby daughter for whom we needed so much—and now, thanks to you, can much buy. Also the mother can now have much better food and can better suckle our dear mite. We are deprived by the cruel fate of our Mother Country, our relatives, our home and property. And your help to us, quite strange and unknown people, supports so much our souls and strength. We thank you heartily once more and pray God's blessing upon your life. Yours faithfully—V & F.

To read hundreds of similar letters, or the answers to exhaustive interviews conducted in Germany, is to become convinced that Communism's propaganda of hatred against America has not penetrated very deeply into the Russian heart and soul. It is A.F.R.F.'s aim to widen and deepen the bridgehead of mutual understanding that inevitably vitiates Communist tyranny, buttressed by falsehoods about American "warmongering," and so lessen the danger of World War III. To do that, A.F.R.F. is

trying to persuade the American public that the precept of "I am my brother's keeper" applies to our brothers behind the Iron Curtain (even in the U.S.S.R.) as well as to brothers in the uncommitted and underdeveloped areas still free from Communist dominion. What is being done is, of course, not nearly enough; the resources of a small band of volunteer citizens cannot compete with the political warfare apparatus of the Soviet government, thinly camouflaged as the Committee for Return.

What is really required is a "conference at the summit" by American political, business, labor, church, educational, and professional leaders. The agenda: what are the irreducible principles underlying our way of life and how much are we prepared to sacrifice to preserve and extend them. It is a commonplace that the world is engaged in a struggle of ideas. If either of the antagonists in this ideological conflict achieves clear-cut victory, the loser may be unable to appeal to a trial-at-arms. In the face of another decade of Communist triumph, an isolated and fearful America, swept by cynicism and hysteria, might conceivably become so unsure of its own values that it would be unwilling to face the command decisions or accept the responsibilities inherent in resistance to the ultimate Communist demand: peaceful coalition in a World Soviet State. On the other hand, if the free world can learn to compete with Soviet skills in communication and political science, there is reason to believe that it may be possible progressively to discredit, disarm, and eventually paralyze whatever forces that are seeking to enslave humanity, whether by overt aggression or the tactics of conspiracy.

To win the struggle of ideas, however, it is necessary that we promote Great Ideas and invest them with Grand Deeds. That "we are rich and you are poor" is not a Great Idea. Neither is the concept of bartering away the lives and property of other human beings in exchange for the leisure to enjoy our own political freedom and increasing wealth. Nor is it even prudent to invent propaganda "gimmicks" that inevitably focus world attention on the gap between noble promises and paltry actions.

From forcible repatriation to redefection is a tragic chronicle of Western strategic ineptitude and, worse, moral blindness. It may well be that if we persist in refusing to hear the bell toll for the Russian people, our potential friends and allies against expanding tyranny, we shall be forced step by step to the precipice below which stretches for all humanity a cindered wasteland shrouded in radioactive mist. The redefection of Soviet citizens threatens to barricade

one of the last paths away from that chasm, the hope that, somehow, peoples of quite different cultures can communicate at human, personal levels and thus avert the collision of governmental policies. The Russians who go back now, like those who were forcibly returned after World War II, will doubtless be exploited as living witnesses to refute the messages of truth we have tried to send through the Curtain. If once the enemy of all mankind can unify his empire, cement the psychological crevices that undermine his control of enslaved manpower, and conclusively discredit the moral values of the West, there will be no check to Communist conquest save surrender or atomic warfare. The American Friends of Russian Freedom are trying to provide a solution that avoids both these dread alternatives.

Reminiscences of the February Revolution

*The April Crisis**

BY IRAKLI TSERETELLI

IV

INSISTING on the necessity of giving stronger support to the government, we did our best to conform our actions to our words. The day after the settlement of the April conflict, the general assembly of the Petrograd Soviet, on the motion of the Executive Committee, resolved by a majority of 2,000 votes against 112 to support the "Liberty Loan" issued by the government, and this resolution was posted in towns and villages all over the country. Furthermore, the Petrograd Soviet published an appeal to the army, calling on the soldiers and the army organizations to intensify their efforts to maintain the discipline and fighting capacity of the armed forces and stressing the fact that without strengthening the national defense the Russian Revolution could not successfully conduct its campaign for an early general peace. This appeal, composed by Voitinsky and couched in simple and vigorous language easily intelligible to the troops, made a strong impression both at the front and in the rear.

Yet, much as we desired to do everything in our power to strengthen the government, we considered it inexpedient to participate in it directly. Our collaboration with the government in the form of support from the outside, inconvenient as it was for both sides, still offered, in our opinion, a better chance of success than the outright participation of Soviet representatives in the Cabinet. So long as we remained outside the government, we were in a better position to exhort the masses to make allowances for the difficulties confronting the Revolution. If we were to take the power in our own hands in the name of the masses, so we reasoned, this would inevitably stimulate their illusions and raise their expectations.

*This is the fourth and last excerpt from Chapter X of the author's unpublished reminiscences. This material is copyrighted by the author [Ed.].

It was for this reason that my closest comrades and I in the Executive Committee fought to the very last against the growing trend in favor of a coalition government.

On April 27, the Chairman of the Soviet, Chkhaidze, received a letter from Prince Lvov, in which the latter, referring to the government's "address," asked him to submit to the Executive Committee the question of the participation of Soviet representatives in the government.

Before the plenum of the Executive Committee convened to discuss the issue, some members of the leading majority gathered at Skobelev's home for a preliminary consultation. This conference was attended by the Social-Democrats (Mensheviks) Chkhaidze, Skobelev, Dan, Liber, Voitinsky, Bogdanov, Gvozdev, and myself; the Social-Revolutionaries were represented by Gots and Avksentiev. Gots acquainted us with the situation in the Social-Revolutionary group with regard to the coalition issue. A formal resolution binding all members had not been adopted, he said. A prominent member of the party, Russanov, as well as a few others, had declared themselves against a coalition. However, a sizable majority of the members favored joining the government, and they invited the S.-D.s to vote with them in the Executive Committee for a coalition. Chkhaidze, who presided at this private conference, then took the floor to express his opposition to participation in the government.

I have been in the chair for ten years¹ [he referred to his chairmanship of the Social-Democratic group in the Duma as well as to that of the Executive Committee] and I usually refrain from interfering with the debates, preferring to listen to fellow-members with a better grasp of the issues than mine. Today, however, I wish to speak out, to share with you the misgivings aroused in me by the proposition of our comrades, the S.-Rs.

At the very beginning of the Revolution, when the Provisional Government was being established, the question of participation of the Soviets in the government was raised. It was even proposed that I, in my old age, become a Minister. I did not think myself fit for such a task; but this was not the point. Other people, better suited, could easily be found among us. Yet the Executive Committee, after discussing the problem of participation in the Cabinet, reached a negative decision. In my opinion, this decision has been proved right by events. Staying out of the government, the Soviet has acquired an authority that has enabled it to channel the mass movement into organized forms and to maintain a democratic order in the country.

When we defend the government, not one of our own kind but a bourgeois government, against criticism by stressing that no government in the world can

¹This and the following speeches are cited from memory. I am certain I have rendered their exact meaning, if not their exact wording [Author's note].

restore peace and carry out radical reforms overnight, the masses listen to us with confidence and draw the conclusion that under such conditions it is inadvisable for socialists to join the government. If we join it, we shall arouse in the masses the expectation of something essentially new, which we shall be unable to fulfil.

Whether such an attitude toward the government is right or wrong, it is rooted in the psychology of those elements of the democracy that are rallied around our organization. We have to consider their frame of mind and to adjust our decisions to it.

Our followers, of course, by no means represent all Russia. Russia is a peasant country, and our Revolution is primarily a peasant revolution. The instructions of rural committees to their delegates, the resolutions of army organizations demanding the formation of a coalition government, reflect the mood of the peasantry, whose voice cannot be ignored. One of the chief causes of the weakness of the Provisional Government is the fact that the peasant class, up to now, has not been adequately organized and is not represented in the government. However, local peasant organizations are springing up everywhere, and any day one may expect the formation of a central organ of the peasantry. The problem of how to enlarge the basis of the government would be solved in the most natural way through the inclusion of representatives of the peasantry. Let our comrades, the Populists [Narodniki] and the S.-Rs. join the government, not as members of the Executive Committee, but as representatives of the peasantry. This would place the government on a firm foundation and give it a genuinely democratic character that would be a source of strength. And we, on our part, would then be able to support the government more effectively than heretofore.

Avksentiev, who spoke after Chkheidze, shared his opinion that in Russia the peasantry should form the basis of a democratic government. He said:

The peasantry has not had enough time to get organized to such an extent as to have a decisive voice in the formation of a new government. True, an all-Russian Peasants' Congress is to convene one of these days in Petrograd and it will set up a permanent organ of its own. We could then join the government as representatives of this Congress. However, the government's proposition was addressed not to us but to the Executive Committee, which already possesses the authority we would still have to acquire. As matters stand, a coalition government cannot be formed at this time without the participation of representatives of the Executive Committee.

Gots emphatically stated that the Social-Revolutionaries considered it impossible to join the government without the Social-Democrats doing the same thing. He said:

This is the general consensus of our group, and I have reserved for myself the right to vote against a coalition in case the S.-Ds. should be unwilling to join the government on the same terms as the S.-Rs. Our party, too, has always fought against any attempt to transplant the "ministerialist" tendencies of

right-wing Socialists in Europe to Russian soil. If we, nevertheless, are ready today to take part in the government, this is due only to the exceptional circumstances of the Russian Revolution. When any clash between the Soviet and the government jeopardizes the very existence of the latter, the participation of Soviet representatives in the Cabinet means not the surrender of hostages to the bourgeoisie but the reaffirmation of the policy of the revolutionary democracy. In our immediate environment, however, we face difficulties similar to yours. Under these conditions, we can accept the responsibility for participation in the government only if you share it with us.

Skobelev, speaking after Gots, recalled the impression made upon the members of the S.-D. group in the Fourth Duma by an appeal made by Vandervelde (who, in the beginning of World War I, had joined the Belgian government), urging the Russian socialists to support the Western democracies against Imperial Germany.

We discussed a reply to this, but in the end we left the appeal unanswered. We knew how to talk with Vandervelde, the Chairman of the International, but we did not know how to talk with Vandervelde, the Cabinet Minister. The Revolution, at a stroke, has transformed us from an irresponsible opposition into a power-exercising national leadership. We have created a government and have supported it. Under the changed conditions, our task has been not to inflame but to hold in check the mounting passions of the populace. For some time now I have been doing nothing but extinguishing fires among workers declaring a strike, among military units refusing to obey orders, among the sailors mobbing their officers at Kronstadt. Appealing to the masses as a representative of the Soviet, I was trusted by them and usually succeeded in making them submit to democratic discipline. If I were now to appear before them as a Minister, might they not tell me that they know how to talk with Skobelev, Vice-chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, but not with Skobelev, the Cabinet Minister?

Bogdanov, who was in charge of the organizational work in the workers' section of the Soviet, reported that the idea of a coalition was meeting with criticism chiefly among the élite of advanced workers who had undergone party training. Among the rank and file, on the other hand, the idea of the participation of Soviet representatives in the government was popular. "It is for this reason," said Bogdanov, "that in many plants the resolutions to this effect, introduced by our comrades, the S.-Rs., are being adopted with enthusiasm. This enthusiasm, however, is born of the illusion that a new government would be able to work wonders immediately. Once these expectations prove unfounded, the inevitable disappointment will undermine the influence of the Soviet on the masses."

This being so, Bogdanov regarded the participation in the government as inexpedient.

This concern over the position of the Soviet was, for me, too, the decisive consideration. I said:

The strengthening of the government is the most urgent task of the moment. We are all agreed that the policies of the government must be brought into harmony with the aspirations of the masses in such a way as to allow the Soviet to support the government most effectively. It is questionable, however, whether the inclusion of Soviet representatives in the government is the best way to achieve this end.

I do not think so. Experience has shown that the Soviet, without merging with the government, retains the greatest possible influence upon the most inflammable section of the population. What was most amazing during the recent crisis was not the lightning speed with which the Soviet, after the settlement of the conflict, restored order, but the fact that in the very midst of the crisis, with popular passions running high as a result of a gross mistake of the government, not one of the extremist parties dared demand the overthrow of the government. They were well aware that such a slogan was disapproved by the Soviet.

So long as we maintain this position, we shall be able not only to check the growth of extremist tendencies in the masses, but also to exercise a real influence upon the government in the direction of a democratization of its policies, since the government and the middle classes which back it are greatly impressed by the power of the Soviet. Should we, on the other hand, in joining the government, arouse hopes in the masses which we might be unable to fulfil, this would strengthen the extremist left-wing trends. And to the extent that our hold upon the masses weakens, our influence on the government will decline, regardless of the presence of our representatives in the Cabinet. The discrepancy between the policies of the government and the yearnings of the masses will increase and, instead of the consolidation of a democratic government, the outcome of our step will be the strengthening of maximalist tendencies in the masses.

Our comrades, the S.-Rs., who labored together with us to build up the Soviet and to strengthen its influence, are unwilling to join the government without us. This I can understand, and I shall not advise them to act in a way I consider unwise for my own party. However, among the supporters of the S.-R. party, as among our own supporters, there are many democratic elements with organizational links, not to any party nor to the Soviets, but to cooperatives, trade unions, and the peasantry. If representatives of this democratic intelligentsia were to replace Miliukov and Guchkov in the Cabinet, this would go far to assure a complete harmony between the policies of government and the Soviet, and would allow us to support the government with greater determination.

I proposed, therefore, that the principle of coalition be rejected by the Executive Committee; but that everything be done to persuade the government to seek a solution of the crisis in the incorporation of democratic elements not connected with the Soviets. Dan, Liber, and Gvozdev expressed similar opinions.

On April 28, the Executive Committee discussed the issue of a coalition government. The outcome of the vote was in doubt because of the differences of opinion within the leading majority. Also, unexpected differences became apparent within the left-wing opposition. Sukhanov, Goldenberg, and a few other left-wingers were among those who advocated participation in the government. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, voiced their unqualified hostility to the idea of coalition. Kamenev declared, on their behalf, that the Bolsheviks were determined to reject any kind of understanding or alliance with the bourgeoisie and would devote all their efforts to the task of preparing the transfer of full power to the Soviet. When Gots interrupted him with the question: "How will you go about preparing this transfer?" he replied: "First, we shall firmly denounce the essentially anti-popular character of the bourgeois government; secondly, we shall do our best to persuade you, the Soviet majority, to take full power into your own hands. . . ." Here one of the members of the majority provoked general laughter by exclaiming: "And then, thirdly, if we do as you say, without accepting your program, you will denounce the antipopular character of the government of the Soviet majority, won't you?"

The differences within the leading majority, by and large, followed party lines. Almost all the Populists (Narodniki), the Social-Revolutionaries, and the Laborites (Trudoviki) favored coalition. The leaders of the S.-Rs. refrained, however, from engaging in polemics with the Mensheviks, and the point of view of the advocates of coalition was most vividly presented by the Trudoviki, Stankevich and Bramson, on the one side, and the "Internationalist," Sukhanov, on the other.

The arguments of both the supporters and opponents of a coalition were the same that had been endlessly repeated, day in and day out, in the press, at public meetings, and in private conversations. Yet the attention of the assembly never flagged, since on the outcome of the debate depended the vital issue of power.

It is a remarkable fact that of all those who supported the idea of a coalition government, no one pleaded for it more fervently than Sukhanov, the inveterate denouncer of the "imperialistic aspirations of the bourgeoisie" and of the "conciliatory tendencies of the Soviet majority" towards the bourgeoisie. As Stankevich told me, Sukhanov regarded himself as the father of the coalition idea. When the first Provisional Government was being formed, he had argued that, to consolidate the victory of the Revolution, the next step

should be the creation of a coalition government in which the Soviet representatives would hold the dominant position. At that time, in the very first days of the Revolution, Sukhanov had probably assumed that the Soviet would choose to be represented in the government by "Internationalists" of his own, Sukhanovist, persuasion. Now, however, the actual correlation of forces in the Soviet left no doubt that the revolutionary "oborontsy" (advocates of national defense) would be chosen to represent the Soviet in a coalition government. This being so, it was not easy to understand why Sukhanov, harsh critic of the entire policy of the Soviet's leading majority, was so doggedly and heatedly insisting on the participation of the "compromisers" in the government. Had he been some kind of scheming Machiavellian politician, his new position might have been explained by the desire to entice the Soviet into joining the government in order to see it compromised. However, there was nothing Machiavellian about Sukhanov. The fact was that his doctrinaire "leftism" went hand in hand with a streak of impressionism, and his writings and speeches often reflected various moods that could not be logically reconciled with his general political position.

Skobelev, Dan, Liber, and I expressed our determined opposition to coalition, well aware that we were moving against the stream. Even in our own ranks, among the Mensheviks, there were some who wanted a coalition government. We were anxious, nevertheless, to make a last attempt to solve the crisis by promoting the inclusion of non-Soviet democratic elements in the government, and we brought into play all our moral influence in an effort to make the assembly adopt a resolution rejecting the participation in the government.

Chkheidze, in putting the issue to a vote, said: "Comrades, I took no part in the debate, but I consider it my duty to declare that after listening to all that has been said here, I cannot take upon myself the responsibility of advising the Executive Committee to have its representatives join the government."

Participation in the government was rejected by 24 votes against 22, with 8 abstaining and a still larger number just evading the vote. While the S.-R. group voted almost in a body for a coalition, Gots, with a smile, ostentatiously raised his hand against it.

After the close of the session, Kamenev, passing by me, stopped for a few words. Stalin, who was with him, also stopped.

"I welcome the decision," said Kamenev, "but you must admit

that it was by no means a democratic expression of the will of the majority, independent of moral pressure from the top."

"This may be so," I replied, "but it seems to me that the decision is more distressing to the followers of *Pravda*, which so eagerly awaits our entrance into the government, than to our own followers."

Stalin, who hardly ever interjected himself into a general discussion or a private conversation, remarked this time: "In my opinion, there are actually no real differences within the majority. Doesn't it come to the same, whether they join the government themselves or carry the present government on their shoulders?"

That same day I communicated the decision of the Executive Committee to Prince Lvov. With complete frankness I set forth the motives that had impelled us to reject the proposition of the government. On behalf of the leading majority, I urged him to seek a solution of the crisis caused by the inclusion in the government of democratic elements not directly linked with the Soviets. As possible candidates I mentioned the names of Peshekhonov and Pereverzev, who were close to the Narodniki, and of Prokopovich and Malantovich, who sympathized with the Social-Democrats.

Prince Lvov was greatly troubled by the complications arising from the decision of the Executive Committee. Yet the idea of bringing non-Soviet democratic elements into the government, far from being unacceptable to him, actually pleased him. He even suggested some possible candidates himself; the name of Krasin among them surprised me and stuck in my memory. I had known Krasin in 1903 when he was closely associated with Lenin. In 1917, however, he kept aloof from the Bolshevik party and held an important position in an industrial concern.

What chiefly interested Prince Lvov was not the list of possible candidates but the eventual relationship between a reorganized government and the Executive Committee. When I pointed out to him that we were prepared to revise the form of our control over the government in order to avoid anything that might be interpreted as interference with the government's functions, Prince Lvov said:

"Well, are you prepared to give up the formula: 'depending on'? There is something humiliating in it to the government; it reflects distrust and suspicion. Only an expression of full and unconditional confidence in the government on the part of the Executive Committee would contribute to a real consolidation of the central power."

I replied that we might change the wording but not the meaning of that formula, and that the principle of supporting a government

so far as it carries out a definite program was sanctioned by European parliamentary practice and represented nothing humiliating. This explanation did not satisfy Prince Lvov. Nevertheless he promised to discuss our proposition with the members of the Cabinet and to keep us informed about further decisions.

However, in the atmosphere of revolutionary excitement that marked those days, a dispassionate search of a way out of the crisis proved impossible.

On the next day, the 29th of April, the sensational resignation of Guchkov took place. It was not so much the resignation itself that was so sensational but, rather, the form it took. Without advance notice to the government, without preliminary discussion of the step with his Cabinet colleagues, the Minister of War abandoned his post in wartime, declaring that the government was no longer able to perform its functions and that he, the War Minister, "could no longer bear the responsibility for the grievous sin that is being committed against the Fatherland."

This action represented a demonstrative break between Guchkov and the right-wing bourgeois elements supporting him with the Provisional Government. In taking this step, he and his followers must have known that in the electrically charged atmosphere of those days, when rumors about alleged counter-revolutionary plotting by right-wing elements easily found credence, such a declaration was grist to the mill of those who wanted to wrench the masses away from the influence of the democratically minded Soviets and to drive them to street demonstrations. This possibility did not worry Guchkov and his set, who were plainly following a policy best described by the slogan "the worse things get, the better."

The excitement caused by Guchkov's exit was intensified by the rumor that the supreme commanders of the army were also preparing to resign, because of solidarity with Guchkov.

On April 30, a delegation of officers from the Petrograd staff, led by Colonel Yakubovich, called on the Executive Committee. It was received by several members who happened to be on the spot, among them Gots and Bogdanov. Yakubovich and his fellow-officers, incensed by Guchkov's action, expressed apprehension that his resignation, especially if followed by that of the commanders of several fronts, would lead to unrest and rioting in the army. The only way to prevent the disintegration of the army, according to Yakubovich and his friends, was the formation of a strong government which included Soviet representatives. The purpose of their

call was to convince the leaders of the Soviet of the necessity to join the government without delay. They said:

Our approach is not that of politicians but of military men. What the policy of the government should be is not our concern at this time. But, as officers bearing the responsibility for the fate of the army, we emphatically declare that only a government including representatives of the Soviet parties can save the country from disaster. The government must have authority in the eyes of the army, and it is only you, the leaders of the Soviet, who possess this authority. You may differ among yourselves as much as you like, you may draw up any programs you choose, but you must join the government, you must take the power in your own hands, particularly power over the army. If you do not join the government, you may expect growing unrest in the army in the near future, the front will collapse, and it is you, the most influential section of the democracy, who will be held answerable for this.

In relating to us the details of this visit, Gots and Bogdanov stressed that Yakubovich and his fellow-officers had impressed them as sincere and resolute men, ready to devote their energies to the consolidation of the democracy. The appearance on the scene of this group of "Young Turks," as Chkheidze at once nicknamed them, with a touch of that humor he retained even in moments of great anxiety, was highly symptomatic. We were aware, of course, that the Yakubovich group was not representative of wide circles of the officer body, whose prevailing views were much farther to the Right. But the mood of this group coincided with that of the army committees and of a large section of democratic organizations of every kind. The latter were literally swamping the Executive Committee, by telegraph and through delegations, with demands for the formation of a coalition government. Guchkov's resignation intensified this campaign, the defection of the War Minister being generally interpreted as a symptom of the disintegration of the Provisional Government. With every passing day, every passing hour, it became more difficult to resist this campaign. It was necessary to give the country a reorganized government without a moment's delay.

On May 1, I had an appointment with Prince Lvov, who wished to acquaint me with the situation in the government created by Guchkov's resignation. In full agreement with my comrades of the leading group of the Executive Committee, I was prepared, should the reorganization we had previously proposed, meet with difficulties, to accept the only other possible solution, a coalition.

In the course of this interview Prince Lvov told me that Guchkov's resignation, in lowering the prestige of an already shaky

government, had dealt the Cabinet a severe blow. Our own proposal had not been accepted, since, in the opinion of the majority of the Ministers, no enlargement of the government without the direct participation of Soviet representatives would give it the much-needed strength. Nekrasov and Manuilov had proposed that the government tender at once a collective resignation to the Committee of the Imperial Duma and the Executive Committee of the Soviet. But Prince Lvov had insisted that a new appeal urging a coalition be made to the Executive Committee; and the government should resign only if this second appeal were rejected. Prince Lvov showed me the draft of the official declaration that was to be published on the following day. In it the government sharply condemned the disloyal behavior of Guchkov, who had willfully decided to leave the government. Simultaneously, the government renewed its proposal of a coalition and expressed the hope that the inclusion of representatives of the democracy would give to the government the fullness of authority indispensable for the salvation of the country.

Under these circumstances, it was plain that there was no longer room for palliative measures to solve the crisis. Another rejection of the coalition by the Executive Committee could only bring about the collective resignation of the government and an aggravation of the crisis.

When I reported my interview with Prince Lvov to my closest comrades they agreed that we should no longer hesitate to accept the offer of a coalition.

All the members of the Executive Committee were present at the Tavrishesky Palace. Chkheidze immediately opened the session, and I, after a brief summary of the situation, proposed that the assembly revise its initial decision to reject participation in the government. Stankevich notes in his reminiscences: "A few days after its first decision, the Executive Committee was compelled to put the government problem once again to the vote. And without any debate, merely after Tseretelli's statement—'I declare for a coalition government' . . .—the question was decided in the affirmative." This account, of course, is a simplification. It is correct that my declaration in favor of a coalition met with such approval that the outcome of the vote was not in doubt. But if there was no debate proper, many opinions, prompted by the imminent commitment of the Soviet democracy to a new, uncharted course, were given expression. The Bolsheviks and Internationalists declared

that they declined all responsibility for the participation of Soviet representatives in the government. The supporters of the coalition voiced their ideas about desirable composition and program of the future government. The session lasted until late into the night; an intermission even had to be arranged to allow the various factions of the Executive Committee an opportunity to formulate their statements with greater precision. The arrival of Kerensky in the midst of the session aroused keen interest, since he was expected to convey some concrete proposals of the government; but he confined himself to generalities about the difficult national situation and the need for a coalition. Dan and Sukhanov questioned him about the intentions of the government regarding the composition and program of the new Cabinet. He replied that no decisions had been made so far and left the assembly, which thereupon resumed discussion.

The issue was then put to a vote by Chkheidze. In doing this, he declared: "Three days ago I said that I could not assume the responsibility for recommending that the Executive Committee delegate its representatives to the government. Now a situation has arisen which compels me to reverse myself and declare that I cannot assume responsibility for advising you to refuse joining the government."

The vote then taken was more significant than that of April 28, when many members, not only of the majority but also of the left-wing opposition, had deliberately avoided voting. Forty-four votes were cast in favor of coalition, nineteen against, with two members abstaining.

The outcome of the vote was cheered by the majority, and the Executive Committee proceeded to discuss the next steps in preparation for a coalition government.

Soviet Propaganda and the Rebellious Artist

BY LUDMILLA B. TURKEVICH

STALIN said that the writer is "an engineer of the human soul," and the Party drew a blueprint for Soviet literature to follow. Russian literature of the last two years and the pronouncements of the Second Congress of Writers clearly reveal the major features of the current policy and show, at the same time, several significant cases of rebellion of the artist.

Many of these features are familiar to the student of the Russian scene. The Soviet writers inculcate in every Soviet mind absolute belief in the greatness of the Soviet Union (A. Perventsev's *The Sailors*, 1953; and V. Sayanov's *Our Native Land*, 1953-54). They intensify in Soviet hearts the desire to dedicate themselves to the task of reconstructing and industrializing their country (V. Revunov's *Between the Steep Banks*, 1954, a novel about a Stalingrad power plant, and A. Bek's *Young People*, 1954). Russian scientists and engineers are urged to push back the frontiers of knowledge and exploit new territories. Their imagination leaps to the conquest of outer space as in A. Kazantsev's story "A Guest from the Cosmos" (1951) and B. Lyapunov's "Dreams Become a Reality" (1954). Minorities and satellites are shown their kinship to the Russian people and their common interests with the Soviet Union. The Ukrainians are given two works about the great Cossack leader who united the Ukraine with Russia, a libretto by Wasilewsky and Korneichuk, *Bogdan Khmel'nitsky* (1954) and N. Rybak's *Pereyaslavl Rada* (1954). Peoples of the Carpathian mountains and Rumania are the subjects of M. Tevelev's *Verkhovina, Our Land So Dear* (1953), S. Sklyarevsky's *The Great Brotherhood* (1954), and of M. Chabanivsky's *By the Danube* (1954). The Eskimo tribes of the Siberian northeast, the Chukchi, often appear in Soviet literature (N. Maximov's *In Search of Happiness* (1952), N. Shundig's *The Fleet-footed Deer* (1952); and several stories by the native Rytheu). The peoples of the East are treated in the three novels: I. Chernev's *Big Brother* (1954), N. Tikhonov's *The Pakistan Tale* (1954), and in R. Kim's *The Girl from Hiroshima* (1954).

Various phases of the strenuous Soviet life are described in detail: ship-building (V. Kochetov's *The Zhurbins*, 1952), turbine construction (V. Ketlinskaya's *The Days of Our Life*, 1953), metallurgy (V. Ocheretin's *The First Daring*, 1953; A. Fadeev's *Black Metallurgy*, 1954-), bacteriology (V. Kaverin's *The Open Book*, 1949), biology (E. Uspenskaya's *Our Summer*, 1953), agriculture (O. Gonchar's *May the Light Burn*, 1954, and Mikhail Sholokhov's second volume of *Virgin Soil Upturned*, 1954). The scenes of all these novels vary but the plots follow the same pattern: the hero is an enterprising, daring innovator, a model Soviet citizen, while the villain is a reactionary, a treacherous saboteur, or a foreign agent who jeopardizes the progress of Communist society. Needless to say, the Soviet hero emerges victorious.

War is an important motif for the Soviet writer. The Russians must not be allowed to forget the frightening experiences of World War II, "The Great Patriotic War." Although the firing has long ceased, the writers still publish war novels. (A. Koptyaeva's *Friendship*, 1954; V. Popov's *The Pouring of Steel*, 1954; N. Chukovsky's *The Baltic Sky*, 1954; and M. Bubennov's *The White Birch*, 1948 and 1952.) They keep rubbing salt in the wounds of their people, lest they forget what war means. They conjure up, from the store of memory, the evil image of the Fascist inquisitor and then cleverly "fade" it into an image of Uncle Sam brandishing an atomic bomb (I. Ehrenburg's *Ninth Wave*, 1952; A. Sakhin's *Clouds at Dawn*, 1954, which deals with Korea; and the previously mentioned *Girl from Hiroshima*). While Soviet propaganda builds up this menacing picture of the United States, it depicts the Soviet Union as the champion of peace and progress. But although it claims peaceful intentions for the Soviets, it acknowledges firmly that the U.S.S.R. is completely prepared for any military operation, which, once started, it intends to fight to the finish. Ehrenburg's long novel, *The Ninth Wave*, is specifically dedicated to this propaganda.

"The engineers of the human soul" follow the party blueprint. They scribble away countless pages of verbosity, repeating ideas, situations, and formulae. Their work is characterized by sanctimoniousness, tedium, and lack of humor. Significantly, however, four works—Uspenskaya's *Our Summer*, Leonov's *The Russian Forest* and Panova's *The Seasons of the Year* and Ehrenburg's *The Thaw*, indicate more than a slavish adherence to the party blueprint. Through the heavy propaganda veneer one can discern a

skillful literary artist, a penetrating observer of human relations, and, at times, a rebellious artist.

Uspenskaya's *Our Summer* describes the conflict in genetics between the progressive Lysenkovite geneticist, Professor Lopatin, and his pro-Western reactionary dean, Shumsky. The novel portrays a group of enthusiastic students of Moscow University spending the summer at their biological field station. Under the inspiring direction of Professor Lopatin the study of animals, birds, and insects is a fascinating and moving experience for the young people. The daily routine of living, innocent flirtations between the youths and the girls, trips to collective farms, practical applications of their academic studies, all form the texture of the novel. But as these students live and work with Professor Lopatin, the vice of regimentation closes in on him. Lopatin notices something new:

In this period a strange new phenomenon was observed in the faculty: some words lost their original meaning and a new terminology emerged. Thus, for example, the word "opinion" ceased to exist. If the trend of thought of this or that professor or scientific worker did not coincide with the trend of thought of the director, then this was no longer called an opinion or a scientific hypothesis, but an "error." Objections, if they were addressed to Shumsky [the dean] or to his colleagues, were called, according to the new terminology, not deliberations or scientific discussions, but an "attack." After an incautious professor permitted an "error" and launched an "attack," his future was predetermined. At first, a label was stuck on him as on to a stuffed bird. On the label was indicated the name of that species of "the erring" with whom the guilty professor was hereafter to be identified. These names, as the names of the stuffed specimens too, had foreign roots: "Mechano-Lamarckist," "neo-Lamarckist," "anti-Darwinist." But the label considered most terrible had a completely Russian root—"Lysenkovite."

After a professor was thus labeled, there was no longer any need to argue with him or to try to convince him that he was not right: They began "to work on him." If he remained stubborn, then purely administrative means came into force: he was given a reprimand, his course was given to a more adaptable man. . . . His works could in no way receive the approval of the scientific council.

The dean did not like to dismiss. Dismissal usually came to the knowledge of the Party committee, the Rector, Ministry of Higher Education—and this complicated matters. It was much more convenient to squeeze the rebel quietly into a very dark corner of his own laboratory, to fence him off by a loyal person, to pay his salary with state funds, use his work and not give him a chance either to breathe or to speak. This was a very convenient system. Thus all those who sought to object, were silenced. Some, however, didn't even try. Some were silent because they loved their work and were afraid to lose it. Others merely hated to quarrel with the directorate. Others didn't even try to grasp what was happening.

Many from the faculty laboratory were working, at the time, on subjects that had no relation to the solution of the leading scientific questions or the needs of national economy. And, for the directors of these laboratories, objection to Shumsky meant objection to themselves; criticism of Shumsky was a criticism of themselves.

Gradually Lopatin is stripped of his assistants, students, friends, and funds, but in the end a "scientific revolution" takes place. The progressive professor is reinstated and the Shumsky group of reactionaries is ousted. In this aspect of the struggle Uspenskaya is faithful to the Soviet blueprint for belles-lettres. Furthermore, like Simonov and other Soviet writers, she voices disapproval of the respect that some members of Soviet scientific intelligentsia have for foreign ideas. Through Lopatin, she stresses the basic party notion that science in the U.S.S.R. has become the arena for a cruel struggle with "cosmopolitanism." The Soviet people are portrayed as generous lovers of mankind who are occasionally molested and led astray by such scoundrels as Shumsky. The reader is reminded of the government call for vigilance against traitors.

But Uspenskaya, the granddaughter of the famous nineteenth-century writer, Gleb Uspensky, does more than the blueprint prescribes. She endows the villain Shumsky with the methods of the government. She shows how scientists can be trampled by government stooges and silenced by political damnation. She inveighs against the cruel treatment given to non-conformists (potential trail-blazers) which atrophies whole branches of pioneering scientific thought and achievement. *Our Summer* is much more than a quarrel between two geneticists. It is an indictment of Soviet despotism and regimentation of creative effort.

Leonid Leonov's *The Russian Forest* is esthetically one of the better current Soviet novels. It has a breadth and a depth often lacking in Soviet works. Its main hero is the Russian forest, in all its poetic, historic, and primeval grandeur. The forest's role in the destinies of its people comprises one of the plot levels. On another plot level the Vikhrov family saga, set against the background of World War II, conveniently meets many of the requirements of the writer's blueprint. In examining the fabric of the novel, however, certain unorthodox details will occasionally catch our attention.

Professor Vikhrov, a scientist of sterling qualities, has dedicated himself to the formulation of certain methods of forest conservation, which he believes to be the very foundation of Russian life. His former classmate and associate, the dandified Professor Gratsiansky,

has built his career on finding fault with Vikhrov's work and sabotaging his project. Gratsiansky's slow and painful persecution has gradually deprived Vikhrov of all that makes life worthwhile—the love of his child Polya, his prestige, his friends, his professorship, and even his ration cards. While he is thus crucified, another tormented soul, Polya, seeks to discover her father's true personality, to understand his ideas, and to fathom the cause of his predicament. She unmasks the villainy of Gratsiansky, exonerates her father, and returns Vikhrov to life and work.

In the course of the novel, Leonov describes the method employed by Gratsiansky to discredit Vikhrov. It began before the opening of the story when Gratsiansky first reviewed a work by Vikhrov.

At that time Ivan Matveevich [Vikhrov] acquired a number of serious critics at whose extreme flank A. Y. Gratsiansky was prominent for the brilliance of his mind and the power of his blow. Inspired by the recently publicized discussion on the reduction of the felling quota for lumber, he put on trial the straight-forward Vikhrov book, found a root of evil, propped it, threw it into perspective, drew in the shortcomings, as if they were consciously clouded by the author, expounded all with an appropriate emotional sauce and produced such a "slick job" that it resembled the travel directions to the gallows.

Then, many considered praise as depraving liberalism, and the rejection of what was good in the name of a "desirable better" as pedagogical wisdom. Unexpected success gave wings to the reviewer, who had vegetated in obscurity. And so, when Vikhrov's next work, *The Forest as an Economical Factor*, appeared, he struck out more boldly and, to tell the truth, hit below the belt. His colleague, however, withstood the blow.

The calumny theme is picked up again in the following excerpt which rises out of a conversation on international relations.

I have heard from people, who know, that there are mines of explosive action . . . and woe to the gaper who steps on one! There are also those of delayed action: such a small block lies for years completely harmless, so that some granny, or other, may even use it as a weight for salting cucumbers . . . and look, one morning—no barrel, no granny! But the most vile of them all, I think are mines of periodic, repetitive action that emit from time to time some gas in small proportions not detectable by any registering apparatus.

"What kind of gas do you have in mind?" asks Vikhrov.

"Well, say the gas of doubt . . . a gas which makes contemporaries doubt one another, and from there, they are on their own, without outside interference." Then he glanced at Taiska dozing in her chair and lowered his voice.

"Now, don't be cross. I agree with some of your critics who condemn the prematurity of your forest theory. But in your views on the forest, you're motivated by lawful patriotic anxieties for the fate of the most important

source of national welfare. Tell me yourself, of what advantage is it to your opponents to declare your views hostile to Soviet society . . . to me for example."

We also come across another interesting conversation. Polya Vikhrov is talking to her father about her longings for a time when there will be

"... peace so that infants will not be slaughtered and the weak will not be trampled." [She interjects significantly], "anyone may weaken on the way. Isn't that so? Not to have to lock our doors, to have friends rather than enemies behind us. . . . And they say that there, too, it's not bad. They live, even listen to music, and plant flowers."

"Where's this 'there'?"

"Well, over there . . . in that . . . oh, how shall I put it? . . . the old world. I have often read about it and I simply can't figure one thing out. There it [the old world] has been rotting for centuries and yet there it still stands. How I'd just love to get a peep at it, perhaps through a tiny chink. Just what is this thing with such durability and vitality? Why hasn't it exploded and fallen to pieces long ago from the sheer weight of human pain and grief alone? . . ." Then Polya adds wistfully, "I'm foolish and funny. Am I not?" [and her father replies, with great earnestness and agitation], "Oh, no. You are not very foolish . . . and . . . far from funny."

Such an admission by bona-fide patriots, a Komsomol and a Party member, is very curious indeed.

Thus here again, as with Uspenskaya, a Soviet author consciously or unconsciously reveals to the reader aspects of Soviet life that do not flatter their Communist society. Leonov shows how science can be hampered. He analyzes the technique of discrediting by calumny, half-truths, and the use of the "slow gas of doubt." His character, Polya, surprises us with her desire to have a peep at the old world. And in his plea for the forest, the respected and talented novelist seems to ask the Soviet people to cherish and protect the God-given talents, energies, and bounties entrusted to them by the Russian past.

In a literature dedicated to the portrayal of "the making of a hero or a fine citizen," Vera Panova's novel *The Seasons of the Year* has an element of heresy: it describes how good Soviet people "go wrong." The novel depicts the disintegration of two potentially good men. One is a young man, Gennady Kuprianov, the son of a hard-working proletarian family of active Communists. The other, Bortashevich, is a factory administrator and a prominent Party worker. Gennady has been brought up in a home where the whole aim of a life of toil is to improve oneself more and more, so as to

become a more productive and valuable member of the Soviet society. But what compensations does Panova show for this unrelieved drudgery? Crowded housing and an excessively modest—in fact, ascetic—standard of living are the reward of the great majority of the toilers. Gennady, who has been somewhat coddled by his mother, rebels against the grim routine of his life. He loafs in a community that is straining every fiber in some sort of “super-human” effort. He falls in with a Soviet underworld gang (these do exist in Utopia!) which claims him, and even here he is beaten up.

The factory boss, Bortashevich, is the kind, affectionate husband of a woman who rebels against the inelegance, coarseness, and frugality of her world. She introduces her husband to a non-Party set and there he sees the difference between their way of life and what he, a good Party man, can afford to give his wife.

“Where do they get it all from?” he burst out, and she answered, “They know how to look after themselves. What can you do with the maximum salary allowed Party members? Just exist.”

He felt a rising resentment that an outstanding man like himself, a fighter, a leading worker, should be given such wretched conditions . . . not even able to dress his wife decently. . . . He began to dislike their tableware. . . .

He wanted to have deep armchairs, like the ones at the office—if people visited them, there was nothing to sit on except those miserable bentwood chairs.

He wanted to live easily, with enough to spare. After all, wasn't that what they had fought for! . . . Bortashevich—and living in one room . . . with a wife and a child coming!

Nadezhda agitates for an apartment, but Bortashevich feels they cannot afford it.

But Nadezhda said that she had an idea. . . . She explained how easily . . . a small amount of expensive raw material in short supply could be sold to private individuals. . . . Bortashevich recoiled, horror-struck. . . .

“Don't you ever dare talk of anything like that again . . . Blockhead,” he said. “I'm a Communist.”

Before long he borrows 3,000 rubles from the grey-haired bookkeeper in his office. At the time, Bortashevich is puzzled by the underling's wealth but asks no questions. One loan leads to another. In time, the debt becomes so large that there is no sense even trying to repay it. “He merely signed every paper the bookkeeper put before him. . . .” And so it happens that another man, born and bred in the Communist world, becomes a tool of the enemy.

Panova, several times a Stalin prize winner, was criticized for

"the detached objectivity" of this novel. Soviet propaganda had not kept her from seeing a serious ulcer present in her world or from daring to show it to her compatriots. Men, she seems to say, cannot deny themselves everything endlessly for the sake of a quota and a pat from Stalin, Malenkov, or Bulganin. The strain of endless drudgery and superhuman exertion must have commensurate rewards, or social evils will grow.

Ilya Ehrenburg's short novel, *The Thaw*, stirred up the most recent storm in Soviet literary circles. Simonov attacked Ehrenburg for putting the Soviet Union in a negative light, but Ehrenburg was prepared with a very plausible retort which laid the blame for "misinterpretation" on the critics.

On the surface, *The Thaw* is an impeccable Soviet story about a machine factory near Saratov, and yet it reveals ideas akin to those found in the other three books just discussed. Judging by the pictures of the factory workers' homes in this novelette, Ehrenburg seems to imply that the great dictatorship of the proletariat shows little concern for the well-being and real happiness of its toilers. If living is so grim and personal prospects so bleak, what is there to inspire the proletariat to the "great effort?" The novelist's excursions into the lives of two Soviet painters raises the question of incentive for real creative activity. What are the possibilities for worthy talent in a world where mediocrity can bring acclaim, and reputations depend on caprice rather than on genius?

Soviet literature of 1953-54 gives the reviewer a painful feeling of regret that literary talents are regimented into mediocrity. The novels are long; the ideas, characters and scenes stereotyped. The official attitude permeates the pages and leaves no room for humor. But as we have seen, a few of the more gifted writers have consciously or unconsciously raised some awkward questions. At times one senses a feeling of rebellion and suspects that even in the monolithic Soviet society the creative artist is fighting for those human qualities which we cherish in the West.

Note on the Soviet Slave Labor Reform of 1954-55*

BY BERTRAM D. WOLFE

DURING the course of 1954 and 1955, evidence began to seep out of a labor shortage on both factory and farm so great that the government was beginning to recruit "free labor" even in its concentration camps, where apathetic slaves had been producing little more than their keep and dying off at an "unprofitable" rate.

At the same time, a shortage of maturing young men of the classes born during the frightful days of the forced collectivization (to be followed by a similar shortage of those born during the great purge), created so drastic a drop in eligible infantry recruits that the Soviet government was compelled to announce a "voluntary reduction" in the size of its infantry. It sought to link this up with the "Geneva spirit" though the drop in the available manpower pool was discernible much earlier. To compensate for this slight drop in the "quantitative" level of its army, the Soviet government has enormously stepped up its drive to raise the "qualitative" level by mechanization and modernization: motorization, armor, equipment, artillery, guided missiles, intercontinental bombers, jet planes, submarines, etc. But this further increased the strains on heavy industry and the shortage of skilled labor power. It is the chief explanation, too, of the renewed emphasis on the always emphasized "primacy" of heavy industry, which accompanied, but of course did not cause, the demotion of Malenkov.

Both the testimony of recently released prisoners, principally Germans, from Vorkuta and Kolyma, and a careful study of the imperfectly concealed changes in demographic statistics (for example, an abnormal jump in the size of the "free" laboring population), reveal that the population of the camps has been permitted in some measure to decrease by releases, shortened terms, and diminished sentencing. At the same time, the conditions of the many millions of slaves in the camps have been somewhat ameliorated by the intro-

*This is a section of the chapter on "The Worker in the Workers' State" from a forthcoming book entitled *Six Keys to the Soviet System*, to be published by the Beacon Press in February, 1956. [Ed.]

duction, or rather the reintroduction, of "wages," decently stocked "canteens" in which to spend them, and the reestablishment as a general rule of the eight-hour day.

A typical measure, which had existed prior to 1937 but had been abolished during the great purge, was to give two or three days credit on the serving of his term for each working day in which the slave laborer actually fulfills or exceeds his norm. Thus, if a prisoner works hard and is strong and productive, he can shorten his term and serve five years in four, or even three.

In practice this does not mean that he is restored to the normal "free" civilian population after his release. For, when he finishes his term, either by administrative decree or by the handicaps of a released prisoner passport, he is able to live and work only in the same area in which he has served, or in similar hardship areas, under police supervision. In demographic statistics he is now added to the free wage-labor population, but in actual practice he is kept in the region, or sent on order, or allowed to choose, distant places similar to those from which he has been released: Kolyma, Vorkuta, Karaganda, the lead mines of Kazakhstan, etc. But he may live outside the camp, send for his family or found a new one, know the privacy of free living quarters and the joy of free work. In any case, his lot has been improved by this transition from forced labor to forced residence.

In the camps, too, one gets the impression that the life of the prisoners is similar once more to what it was under Stalin in the early middle thirties, that "idyllic" period between the fearful days of the "liquidation of the kulak as a class" and the fearful days of the blood purges known as the *Ezhovshchina*.

This "reform"—if we can give it so large a name—was caused by a number of factors, among which we can distinguish:

- (a) The power crisis in the leadership, following the death of Stalin;
- (b) The pressure of the United Nations investigation of forced labor;
- (c) The shortage of manpower in factory, farm, and army recruiting;
- (d) The great strikes in Vorkuta and other camps, following the death of Stalin, which were finally broken by a combination of promises of amelioration with the machine-gunning of hundreds of strikers;
- (e) The transfer of jurisdiction over many of these remote area

industries from the MVD to their respective industry sectors when the Party decided to weaken the power of the MVD at the time of the execution of Beria;

(f) The fact that the heads of the respective industries are more interested in production figures than in punitive terror measures, and are seriously handicapped in fulfilling the plan when they are charged with a huge force of unproductive and apathetic slave labor for which their plan targets are raised accordingly by their superiors.

The "reform" leaves the monstrous pressure of millions of slave laborers still hanging over the "free labor" of the Soviet Union, and free labor everywhere. To date it no more touches the essence of the system than did the fact that some slaves in the American South came to be treated with greater consideration by their masters after the slave trade was abolished and it became harder to purchase fresh slaves to replace those worn out or worked to death.

The human lot of those who have been transferred from forced labor to forced residence has been considerably improved, though they do not yet live as well as, say, Lenin, when he was a forced resident of Siberia under the last Tsar. The lot of the slave laborer in the camps has also been ameliorated. In any case, the development is to be welcomed, and encouraged, by further United Nations and International Labor Organization investigations, and by the non-governmental activities of such anti-slavery groups as the *Commission Internationale contre le Regime Concentrationnaire* and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Indeed, such organizations concerned with the recrudescence of involuntary servitude in its modern forms in the twentieth century should be encouraged by this reform to redouble their efforts until slave labor and forced residence are alike abolished. It is well to remember that from the first anti-slavery societies of the eighteenth century until the abolition of the slave trade took more than half a century, and it took another third of a century until the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863. Has the second half of the twentieth century any more important business at hand than the liberation of these millions of rightless slaves?

Book Reviews

DINERSTEIN, HERBERT S., and GOURÉ, LEON. *Communism and the Russian Peasant and Moscow in Crisis: Two Studies in Soviet Controls*. With a Foreword by Philip E. Mosely. Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1955. 254 pp. \$4.50.

This volume contains two separate monographs sponsored by the Rand Corporation. The first, *Communism and the Russian Peasant*, written by Herbert S. Dinerstein is a study in historical perspective, of Soviet social control of the collective farm peasantry. It touches upon certain aspects of Communist agrarian policy and the political and economic organization of collective farms. The second, *Moscow in Crisis*, which Mr. Dinerstein co-authored with Leon Gouré, is an investigation of the background, relevant events, and aftermath of the German threat to Moscow in October, 1941. Both monographs are based upon Western and Soviet published sources and the testimony of Soviet refugees. While, on the surface, these monographs are unrelated, together they raise important issues concerning the future of Soviet industrial development and the fate of the Soviet system itself.

Between 1928 and 1950 the net output of Soviet industry increased by approximately 493 percent while the net output of Soviet agriculture increased by only 136 percent. By 1954 the increases over 1928 were 737 and 136 percent, respectively. During this period the Soviet population increased by at least fifty million persons. Most of the in-

crease occurred in the urban population.

These vital statistics explain why most western students believe that the agrarian base of the Soviet industrial and military empire is the Achilles' heel of the Soviet system. The post-World War II rate of Soviet industrial development has exceeded the rate of industrial development of Western Europe. Between 1948 and 1953 the national product of the United States grew almost thirty percent faster than that of Western Europe but grew only sixty-six percent as fast as that of the Soviet Union. However, even inflated official Soviet statistics indicate that the rate of Soviet industrial development has constantly decelerated. This raises two all-important questions. First, will the limitations of the Soviet agricultural base force reduction of the rate of Soviet industrial growth so that it no longer exceeds the rate of growth of the West? A conservative estimate indicates that the Soviet regime has at its disposal resources to achieve, on a per capita basis, a fifteen percent increase in net farm output during the next seven years. Its ability to achieve this increase will, to a large extent, depend upon the effectiveness of its rural control system. *Communism and the Russian Peasant* is helpful in arriving at an answer to this first question.

Secondly, even if it can maintain high rates of industrial growth, can the Soviet government survive the pressures exerted upon the system of collectivized agriculture in time of crisis? Data compiled by the

Harvard Refugee Interview Project indicates that not only the peasantry but all strata of the Soviet population abhor the collective farms more than any other institution of the Soviet system. *Moscow in Crisis* throws light upon whether or not the Soviet control system can prevent dislike of the collective farm system and other dissatisfactions from turning into outright disaffection and active disloyalty, and from bringing about cessation of the flow of supplies from the countryside to the military establishment and the urban population in time of severe crisis.

With respect to the first question, materials presented in *Communism and the Russian Peasant* indicate that the Soviet system of social control of the peasantry may prevent the government from realizing technically possible increases in agricultural production in several ways. The low agricultural productivity and output of the Soviet Union results, in the opinion of the author, from the Soviet regime's failure "in its major task: the peasant is not convinced of the connection between work and reward, and he is not, therefore, inclined to give his all to work on the collective farm." (p. 218.)

From the material presented it also seems conclusive that the Soviet regime cannot quickly remold by a mere increase in economic incentives the attitude of apathy, of passive resistance, and of evasion which its policies have developed in the peasantry. Promises of a better life high in the sky by and by, which the Soviet regime has showered upon the peasantry since 1929, have combined with the tragic reality of rural Soviet Russia to convince the peasant that the collective farm system

is, in the words of a former collective farmer, "the kind of system where you have to steal if you want to live." (p. 125.)

Communist policies have taught the peasant to distrust and mislead agricultural officials. The Party's policy of squeezing the collective farmers in order to maintain high rates of industrial development and support a large military establishment has created an unhealthy situation in which: "Particularly liked is the efficient manipulator of regulations who thereby succeeds in making the peasant's lot somewhat more bearable. On the other hand, the official without this talent, no matter how honest and efficient otherwise, is unable to win the loyalty and affection of the people." (p. 126.)

State agricultural officials, however, are usually not allowed to maneuver in a manner which would make life more bearable for the peasant. They are so burdened by centrally imposed output demands and so limited in their choice of means for meeting them that they must cheat the peasant in order to report overfulfillment of the output plans.

But the agricultural official must also cheat the state. Agricultural officials, forced to meet impossible output targets by impossible methods, are compelled to form mutual protection associations which falsify records, obtain supplies through illegal channels, and give to the state what the law demands should be given to the peasants. "An official who manages such deals skillfully is a successful executive. If things go well, he is rarely troubled by his superiors." (p. 106.) Just as the system forces the official to be ruthless and without conscience toward

the peasantry, it also tends to convert loyalty toward Party and State into opportunistic self-aggrandizement. As the author states: "Mutual protection and concealment of extra-legal activities often may be directed toward fulfillment of plans by informal, irregular procedures. But the practice is easily transferred to concealment of irregular behavior directed toward personal gain, because the whole structure for graft exists." (p. 96.) It is through this "structure for graft" that any attempts of the Soviet government to radically change its agricultural policies of the past twenty-five years and to sharply increase agricultural production must be carried out.

The reader must approach *Communism and the Russian Peasant* with caution. Descriptions of Communist agrarian policies and of Soviet rural political and economic control organizations contained in it are based upon a dangerously selective survey of the Soviet press. They are consequently schematic, dated, misleading and often erroneous. The author bases much of the monograph upon a survey of the agricultural press during the years 1947-1950. A vast Soviet monographic literature is generally ignored.

This monograph is a study of Soviet rural social, as distinct from political and economic, controls as they are reflected in the attitudes of collective farmers and agricultural officials, who have fled the Soviet Union. As such it must be approached almost as raw material for research.

The reader need not approach *Moscow in Crisis* with the same reservations. It is a definitive study of the strengths and weaknesses of Soviet social control at a critical

moment in Soviet history. In October, 1941, the Germans drew even nearer to Moscow than did General Denikin during the Civil War period. The populace displayed little concern for the fate of the Soviet government. But its attitude was complex, ranging from the unmixed pleasure of a small group anticipating "liberation" to the indifference and apathetic resignation of the majority awaiting the arrival of the Germans at any hour. Significantly, "There is no memory of a general popular sentiment for a heroic, last-ditch defense." (p. 210.)

Hostility toward the government in general was revealed in the sentiment that years of sacrifice for the future had been wasted. "We starved so that the army would get millions and millions, and these found their way into the pockets of the thieving bosses." (p. 153.) But the hostility displayed by all was directed mostly at the lower and intermediate party and government officials who fled between October 5 and 17, when the Politburo took measures to save key cadres and personnel. "Even some of those who were most anxiously awaiting the coming of the Germans were nonetheless indignant that the leaders were running away." (p. 213.)

Popular discontent with collectivized agriculture came to the surface. According to the authors, some peasants anticipated abolition of collective farms by the Germans, and the inhabitants of Moscow looked forward to reduction of food prices and the establishment of free trade which the Germans were reported to have carried out in Smolensk, Kursk, and Orel.

Moscow in Crisis, like *Communism and the Russian Peasant*, presents conclusive evidence of the limita-

tions imposed by Soviet social controls upon the Soviet government's ability to mobilize the human resources of the U.S.S.R. Both monographs indicate this source of Communist weakness is also a source of strength. At the height of the October, 1941 crisis, in the absence of the traditional political, police and military control organs, "... the great majority of the population was not actively hostile to the regime. There appeared neither desire nor intention to destroy the symbols of Soviet power, and there was little verbal hostility directed against the Politburo or against Stalin himself." (p. 225). Moreover, when the Politburo reappraised the power behind the German advance upon Moscow, and on October 19 issued an unequivocal state-of-siege decree, demanding all-out resistance on the part of the population which it had arrogantly abandoned at the height of the crisis, the population did resist. Both monographs provide abundant illustrations of the skill with which the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, always playing both sides against the middle, utilizes the institution of the scapegoat.

Scapegoating is least effective amongst the peasantry. But even here it is helpful to the Party leadership. An old peasant in a concentration camp as a result of the policies of the Party leadership blames the local NKVD official and utters "God is high in the Heavens and Moscow is far away" with the same resignation displayed by pre-revolutionary peasants when they said "God is high in the Heavens and the Tsar is far away." The Moscow populace berated the lower and

intermediate officials who fled as a result of a directive of the State Defense Committee issued on or about October 15, 1941. It even resorted to violence against them, but the Party leadership was spared even verbal hostility. Officials who fled later were summarily tried by the NKVD and incarcerated in concentration camps for deserting in time of danger. Officials who remained in Moscow were imprisoned under the same article of the Criminal Code for being friendly toward the advancing Germans. The population was mollified and the Hobbesian "war of all against all" was demonstrated to be an effective instrument of modern totalitarian government.

The authors show that another source of political dividends is the seeming ability of the Party leadership to make hope spring eternal whenever circumstances require it. Both monographs indicate that the Party generally succeeds in arousing expectations of a better future in the Soviet youth, even in the countryside. The ability of the Party after 1941 to gain the active support of the peasantry with the promise, never explicitly stated, that the collective farms would be disbanded after the war, indicates that repeated disillusionment does not neutralize the strength of this method of social control. Both monographs indicate that Pareto's "believers led by manipulators" is a potent prescription for totalitarianism even when at least some of the manipulators are believers and most of the manipulated are not.

JAMES E. SULLIVAN
*Russian Research Center
Harvard University*

SUKHANOV, N. N. *The Russian Revolution, 1917*. Tr. and ed. by Joel Carmichael. London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1955. 691 pp. \$10.00.

Sukhanov's seven-volume memoir, *Zapiski o Revolutsii* (Berlin and Moscow, 1922) has long been considered by students of the Russian Revolution as source material of primary importance. It is not in any sense a history, but a unique personal record of the events from February to November, 1917, written from the point of view of a Marxist socialist. The present volume is an abridged translation of Sukhanov's work, condensed to about half the original.

Sukhanov, whose real name was Himmer, was a remarkable personality and a talented journalist (he contributed to Gorky's magazine and, in 1917, to his Petrograd daily). Cantankerous, headstrong, intellectually honest and idealistic, he had an overriding passion for politics, a genius for knowing everybody, and for being at the right place at the right time. Lenin and Trotsky respected him. Miliukov called him "a talented writer and a good observer" whose characterizations were "vivid and mostly true."

After the fall of the Tsar, Sukhanov became one of the key members of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and was one of its negotiators with the Provisional Government. A doctrinaire socialist, he was tormented, in 1917, by ambivalent feelings. He criticized the majority of the Soviet for their defensist policy (he was a defeatist) and the Provisional Government as representatives of "the imperialistic tendencies of the bourgeoisie." He regarded the Bolshe-

viks as "champions of democracy," but he was opposed to their taking of power, alone, without the collaboration of other socialists. He thought Lenin was "dogmatic, violent and dictatorial," yet he regarded him as "a champion of democracy."

Some of the most valuable parts of the book are Sukhanov's colorful sketches of the Who's Who of the Revolution.

Of Kerensky, whom he knew well before the Revolution, he writes: "I used to say that Kerensky had golden hands, meaning his supernatural energy, amazing capacity for work, and inexhaustible temperament. But he lacked the head for statesmanship and had no real political schooling. Without these elementary and indispensable attributes, the irreplaceable Kerensky of expiring Tsarism, the ubiquitous Kerensky of the February-March days could not but stumble headlong and flounder into his July-September situation, and then plunge into his October nothingness, taking with him, alas! an enormous part of what we had achieved in the February-March revolution."

Of Miliukov in the midst of the April crisis: "This man of destiny carried out a policy that was fatal not only to democracy and the revolution but also to the country, his own theories, and himself personally. While making obeisance to the principle of Great Russia, he contrived, with one brutal, violent blow, to smash both the principle and himself. Nevertheless, for me there was no doubt whatever: this fateful man was the only one capable of incarnating, in the eyes of Europe, the new bourgeois Russia that had arisen on the ruins of Rasputin's land-holding society."

Of Lenin as an orator: "Lenin was in general a very good orator—not an orator of the consummate, rounded phrase, or of the luminous image, or of absorbing pathos, or of the pointed-witticism, but an orator of enormous impact and power, breaking down complicated systems into the simplest and most generally accessible elements, and hammering, hammering, hammering them into the heads of his audience until he took them captive."

Of Chernov: "Without Chernov the SR Party would not have existed, any more than the Bolshevik Party without Lenin—inasmuch as no serious political organization can take shape round an intellectual vacuum. But the difference between Chernov and Lenin was that Lenin was not only an ideologist but also a political leader, whereas Chernov was *merely a littérateur* [Sukhanov's italics]. . . . But Chernov—unlike Lenin—only performed half the work in the SR Party. During the period of pre-revolutionary conspiracy he was not the party organizing centre, and in the broad arena of the revolution, in spite of his vast authority amongst the SRs, *Chernov proved bankrupt as a political leader* [italics Sukhanov's]. Here, where ideology should have yielded to politics, Chernov was fated not only to wear out his authority but also to break his neck."

Of Martov: "But surely Martov must be given the palm; no one had a pen like his; no one showed himself so completely its master in the full meaning of the word. He was capable, when necessary, of giving his writing the brilliant wit of Plekhanov, the striking power of Lenin, the elegant finish of Trotsky." And elsewhere: "His excessive, all-embracing analytical think-

ing apparatus was no help and was sometimes a hindrance in the fire of battle, amidst the unprecedented play of the elements. And later we shall see—even in my account, the account of a follower and apprentice—to what criminal inactivity Martov was condemned more than once by his Hamletism and his ultra-refined analytical web-spinning at moments demanding action and aggressiveness. These moments—critical moments!—will always remain my bitterest memories of the revolution. For the consequences of his errors in these critical moments were enormous, if not for the revolution as a whole, at least for his party and for himself."

Of Trotsky during the October days: "Trotsky, tearing himself away from work on the revolutionary staff, personally rushed from the Obukhovskiy plant to the Trubochny, from the Putilov to the Baltic works, from the riding-school to the barracks; he seemed to be speaking at all points simultaneously. His influence, both among the masses and on the staff, was overwhelming. He was the central figure of those days and the principal hero of this remarkable page of history."

For Sukhanov's only reference to Stalin as "a sort of gray blur, dimly looking up now and then and not leaving a trace," he later paid with his life.

For some years after the November Revolution, Sukhanov worked as a Soviet functionary in the sphere of planned economy. Soon after the trials and purges of the Mensheviks in 1931 he was sent to the Verkhne-Uralsk concentration camp. He made one appeal to the government of the "gray blur," now

in power. It was the last that was heard of him.

Mr. Joel Carmichael, the editor and translator, has an interesting and well-written introductory chapter. One unfortunate feature of this chapter is the editor's overemphasis on Sukhanov's objectivity and "detachment." From the pages of Sukhanov's memoir, however, it appears abundantly clear that the author was a doctrinaire Marxist and that it was from this point of view that he interpreted the events he so brilliantly recorded.

DIMITRI VON MOHRENSCHILDT
Dartmouth College

MAYO, H. B. *Democracy and Marxism*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1955. 364 pp. \$5.50.

This is a good introduction to the study of Marxism, as it has come to be understood since the development of contemporary Stalinism. In nine chapters Mr. Mayo discusses Marxist philosophy, sociology, political theory, philosophy of history, ethics, and Marxist scientific method, such as it is. Almost everything that Mr. Mayo says has already been said before. However, this book probably is the best available brief synthesis of all the major aspects of Marxism which has yet appeared. One reason for this is an unusually felicitous style and coherence of argument.

Mr. Mayo's book does not offer as incisive an analysis of major Marxist texts as the work of Plamenatz, *German Marxism and Russian Communism*, nor does it make the praiseworthy effort of Alfred Meyer in his brief study of *Marxism*,

to relate the thought of Marx to the historical circumstances in which it developed. It does not bring to bear such powerful weapons of philosophical and scientific theory as are available in Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. However, this does not mean that the book has no point of view, or that it lacks unity. This is a happy combination of essay and textbook. The major propositions of Marxism are subjected to an extremely fair, wise, urbane, and often witty examination and criticism from the point of view of a liberal and tough-minded democratic political scientist. The author gives credit to Marx for important contributions to social science, and he respects the moral earnestness of Marx and his successors. While he has faith in democracy, he is keenly aware of the fact that the strength of Marxist socialism and of contemporary Soviet Communism is derived from indignation aroused by evils of the established order in the West.

My chief criticisms of this work are as follows: It seems to me that it too easily identifies Leninism and Stalinism with Marxism. This is a particularly serious error today, when Russian Marxism has been so vastly altered. Secondly, the author displays relatively little understanding of the psychology of Marxism and Communism. He does not seem to realize to what an extent Marxist and other radical movements are irrational and often desperate, in other cases, selfish and careerist, responses to the apparent failure of traditional institutions and philosophies. Thirdly, I feel that Mr. Mayo does not make a sufficient effort to discover the underlying attitudes and principles

which give at least a measure of unity to Marxist thought. On the other hand, as I have already indicated, there is a failure to bring out the variety of schools of thought within Marxism.

On the whole this is a very useful book. It can be profitably read by college students, either as a text or as supplementary reading in courses in several disciplines. The recent appearance of a number of studies of this kind, mostly by British or British-trained scholars, offers encouraging evidence of the vitality of non-Marxist political thought, and leads us to hope that we may cope with Communism without descending to irrationality.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
Yale University

WHITING, ALLEN S. *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1954. 350 pp. \$5.50.

This new book by Allen S. Whiting treats the earliest and less familiar period of Soviet relations with the "Middle Kingdom"—a period which found its end with Peking's official recognition of the Soviet regime on May 31, 1924. Mr. Whiting, who has conscientiously studied Russian and Western source material covering these years, gives a good account of this period and attempts to elucidate the motives underlying Soviet behavior toward China as well as the question whether the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950 was inevitable historically and what early processes brought it about. The author begins his study with a clarification of the Bolsheviks'—better to say, of Lenin's—

position regarding China before the Revolution, and shows that as early as 1912 Lenin had advocated the policy later adopted by the Comintern in 1923-1926, namely, cooperation between the Communists and the Chinese Nationalist party, or Kuomintang. In 1920 the Communist attitude toward the Chinese revolution was further defined at the Second Congress of the Comintern. The resolutions of this Congress called upon the Communists to work hand-in-hand with the bourgeois democracy of the colonial and semi-colonial areas, as well as "to establish the closest possible alliance between the Western European proletariat and the revolutionary peasant movement in the East."

The first part of the book under review describes this earliest period of Communist interest in China and is the most interesting and valuable section. Unfortunately, the author abandons his study of applied Comintern policy in China and turns his attention to the better-known evolution of diplomatic negotiations between Moscow and Peking. This change in Mr. Whiting's attention can be explained through his statement that in the early 1920's there occurred a "transformation of Narcomindel strategists from revolutionary propagandists to Russian statesmen." It can hardly be denied that many aspects of Soviet foreign policy bear a close resemblance to national ways of pre-revolutionary Russian diplomacy. It should be borne in mind, however, that the aims of tsarist diplomats were primarily the security of their nation and the territorial aggrandizement of their empire, while the basic objectives of the Communist rulers have been, along with defense of

their state, the unbounded—theoretically, even universal—expansion of their ideology and political system. The coincidence of ways and methods of pre-revolutionary Russian and post-revolutionary Soviet politicians is due to the fact that strategical necessities, geographical setting, and economic needs conditioned by the same territory have been identical in both periods. By disregarding the basic, long-range objectives of Soviet foreign activity Mr. Whiting has limited himself to a superficial and schematic description of the Comintern's work in Southern China and has been unable to avoid a certain confusion in his conclusions. The author even failed to mention that as early as 1920 a representative of the Comintern in Shanghai, G. Voitinsky, together with Professor Chen Tu-hsia, founded the Chinese Socialist Youth Group and secured from the Comintern a monthly allowance of \$5,000 for its use. Out of this group, the following year, grew the Chinese Communist Party, whose secretary for the next six years was Chen Tu-hsia himself. Mr. Whiting likewise neglects the role played by Chu Chiu-pai, the only Chinese correspondent in Moscow in 1920-23 and Party Secretary in 1927-28, in furthering Soviet activity throughout China. Chu's articles in the *Peking Morning Post* decisively contributed to Soviet prestige in China and greatly influenced both the Chinese bureaucracy and Chinese intellectuals.

While a large section of Mr. Whiting's book is devoted to Russian-Chinese relations in Manchuria and Mongolia, the topic of Soviet-Chinese relations in Sinkiang, the westernmost province of China to which White Russian forces operat-

ing in Central Asia retreated during the Civil War, is treated only sketchily. In 1920-1921 Sinkiang became an important center for anti-Bolshevist activity, while the Reds in turn made a great effort to bring this province under their influence, and only the energy of Governor Yang saved this region during that time from Soviet encroachment and delayed its occupation by the Reds for almost fifteen years. It is perhaps worthwhile to note that, while Mr. Whiting sees no precedent for the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950, Russian statesmen in the last century—in both the 1860's and 1890's—had aspired to coordinate Russian-Chinese policies. Count Witte was a leading proponent of Russian-Chinese friendship, while his friend and co-worker, Prince Ukhtomsky, wrote several works on Russian-Chinese relations.

An absence of historical perspective in Mr. Whiting's book and the omission of many important details of Soviet-Chinese relations in the early post-revolutionary period make the work rather incomplete and weaken the author's analysis, as well as his conclusions. Consequently, the reader remains uncertain what the implications of this era actually were for later Soviet-Chinese relations.

SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY

Harvard University

VISHNIAK, MARK. *Dan Proshlomu*. New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1954. 409 pp. \$3.00.

Mark Vishniak, a noted legal scholar and author of several books in Russian, French, and German, was one of the leading intellectuals

of the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party during the years of the Revolution and afterward. More than half of his *Dan Proshlomu* (Tribute to the Past), an autobiography, is devoted to the events of 1905-1907 and 1917-1918 and to the part the author played in them.

"I was not a general of the Revolution," writes Vishniak, "and never played a leading role either in the party or the revolution. . . . Still I did play a role in the party and consequently in the events of 1917." This is too modest a statement. While still a student at Moscow University, in the beginning of 1905, Vishniak joined the Socialist Revolutionary Party and soon became a member of the executive committee of its Moscow branch. He participated actively in the Moscow armed uprising of December, 1905; he was later a delegate to the first congress of the S.R. Party held in Finland, was arrested several times, spent a few years in several prisons and in Siberian exile. He studied at various universities abroad and wrote for Russian liberal and socialist magazines. The Revolution of 1917 found him again in Moscow, where he was one of the editors of the party organ. He soon moved to Petrograd where he was sent as the party's representative to the committee appointed by the Provisional Government to prepare an election law for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. At the same time, he was one of the editors of the Petrograd daily, *Delo Naroda*, central organ of the S.R. Party. Vishniak was also a member of the executive committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies. In October, 1917, he was elected general-secretary of the so-called Pre-Parliament which the Provisional Government

convened a few weeks before the Bolshevik coup d'état. Later he was elected to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly and at its first (and last) session he was chosen by a large majority as secretary-general of the Assembly.

First as a student at Moscow University and at various German universities, then as a revolutionary, and later as a political exile in Paris, Vishniak came in close contact with the outstanding representatives of the Russian intelligentsia of all shades of opinion. In 1917 and the beginning of 1918, he stood in the very center of the great events of the Revolution. Scores of former leading Russian intellectuals—university professors, scholars, scientists, philosophers and writers, journalists and public men, among them almost the entire leadership of the various Russian political parties pass across the pages of this book. He has something important and characteristic to say about almost all of them.

The chapters dealing with the February Revolution, the October Bolshevik coup d'état, and the historic session of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, dissolved by the Bolsheviks, contains many interesting and highly important episodes, facts, and details, which are not to be found in any other history or memoir of the Russian Revolution. From Vishniak's book we can clearly see what really happened in 1917 and why the Bolsheviks were able to overthrow the newly-won Russian democracy and establish in its stead a dictatorship over the Russian people. I have read all the accounts of the historic meeting of the Constituent Assembly and I find Vishniak's the most objective,

the most vivid, and the most interesting.

No less important is the concluding chapter of the book in which the author attempts to analyze why the democratic Revolution, which at its start was so enthusiastically greeted by all the ethnic groups and all the social classes of Russia, was so tragically overthrown, and why the Bolsheviks, who represented only a small minority, were able to defeat all their opponents and retain power. According to Vishniak, the causes were many, objective and subjective, but, in general, it could be said that the same causes that had made the swift victory of the February Revolution possible also led to its collapse. The 1917 Revolution came unexpectedly, but it had been prepared by many generations. The last 150 years of the Romanov's saw a never-ending struggle by the regime to preserve serfdom and autocracy. Those years witnessed the Pugachev peasant uprising, the Decembrist revolt of 1825, the revolutionary movement of the 1860's and 1870's, the active struggle of the *Narodnaya Volya* (Party of the People's Will) and later of the Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries, and, finally, the Revolution of 1905-1907, all of which combined to steadily undermine the very foundations of political and social order. "It cannot be said that, if not for the war, there would have been no revolution in Russia," writes Vishniak. "But it can be assumed that, if there had been no war, the revolution would not have occurred in 1917."

Left-wing Russian socialists in 1917 coined the phrase: "Either the Revolution will devour the war or the war will devour the revolution." The February Revolution, says

Vishniak, "did not devour the war; nor did the war devour the democratic revolution. The Bolsheviks, however, devoured both the war and the democratic revolution." The left-wing socialist leaders of the February Revolution, says Vishniak, in most cases over-estimated the danger to their new freedom from the Right and underestimated the danger from the Left.

The Russian socialist in 1917 lived in constant fear of civil war, in much the same way as the Western democracies in 1933-39 feared world war and therefore did not dare stop Hitler, when it was still possible.

Professor Vishniak's *Dan Proshlomu* is more than an interesting and highly readable autobiography of a Russian intellectual who for many years stood in the front ranks of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. It is also a valuable contribution to the literature of the Russian liberation movement of the twentieth century and to the history of the Russian Revolution and the Communist dictatorship. It should by all means be made available to the English-reading public.

DAVID SHUB

New York City

DE GRUNWALD, CONSTANTIN. *Tsar Nicholas I.* Tr. by Brigit Patmore. New York, Macmillan, 1955. 294 pp. \$4.50.

The publishers are to be congratulated upon making available to the American reader this excellent translation of a work originally published in France nine years ago under the title, *La vie de Nicholas Ier.*

Grunwald's biography of Nicholas

is a scholarly work, its pages stiffened with the embroidery of many footnotes. Its sources are entirely European and include Soviet as well as pre-revolutionary Russian monographs. M. de Grunwald is thoroughly at home with these materials and he has also drawn heavily upon materials from the Viennese archives, especially the reports of the Austrian ambassadors to St. Petersburg. Unfortunately, he seems unaware of or unimpressed by Professor Mazour's excellent study of the Decembrists (*The First Russian Revolution, 1825*) and of the late Max Laserson's contributions in his *American Impact upon Russia*.

The latter omission is perhaps readily understandable because de Grunwald's emphasis is very strongly political. One might say that he, like Karamzin, sees the history of Russia as properly a history of the state and sees the history of the state as the history of the reigning monarch. This is fully understandable and certainly justified in a biography, but it limits the book to the conventional approach. M. de Grunwald, in short, finds in Nicholas absolutism *par excellence*. This interpretation, sanctified by tradition, is strongly rooted in fact. No one can deny that Nicholas was always autocratic nor that he became increasingly despotic as the years passed.

It is not, however, nearly so clear that Nicholas' absolutism was due to and justified by superhuman forces. Yet that is also a part of de Grunwald's thesis. "It has been said," he writes approvingly, "that every country has the government it deserves. . . . There is an old sociological law, according to which, if the structure of society is weak so much the stronger must be the

supreme power. . . . The tragic result of the Decembrist movement had shown in an irrefutable way that the time to liberate the enslaved forces of the Russian nation had not yet come. . . . So it is as a despot that Nicholas I . . . reigned over the vast Empire of Russia." (pp. 152, 153.)

These are matters over which reasonable men may honestly disagree, and de Grunwald's thesis is singled out here not in derision but as characteristic of his approach. Within the limits he has set for himself, he has produced a useful if somewhat standardized account. It does not constitute either a well-rounded history of the period nor an adequate treatment of social, economic, and cultural developments. Such matters are beyond its scope. As a contribution to a larger story, *Tsar Nicholas I* will be welcomed by most teachers and students of Russian history.

WARREN B. WALSH

Syracuse University

ARMSTRONG, JOHN A. *Ukrainian Nationalism: 1939-1945*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1955. 322 pp. \$5.00.

This book probes into one of the most important problems of contemporary East European history: what happens when Soviet rule is overthrown. With the combined skill of a historian and a political scientist, the author analyzes events in the Ukraine under the German occupation of that country during the Second World War. His findings not only represent a signal contribution to recent Slavic history, they provide an accurate insight into the aftermath of totalitarianism.

Ukrainian nationalism was the most active political movement in the Ukraine under the German occupation. It developed and gained limited successes despite German suppressive measures, its own weakness (caused by interne-cine strife) and the slow response of the masses of Ukrainians in the Eastern Ukraine to the doctrines of the nationalists. While the supreme goal of the nationalists—the creation of an independent Ukrainian state—remained unfulfilled, their impact on the cultural, political, and religious life of the country was considerable, especially in view of the difficulties which faced them. At times the reader's disapproval of their semi-Fascist methods is tempered by admiration for their courage and determination. The final impression is of an unmistakably vital force in contemporary Ukraine, frustrated as much by its own shortcomings as by external circumstances.

Based on primary sources carefully checked and scrutinized, Professor Armstrong's study can be regarded as a model of scholarly enquiry into recent history. Its only weakness lies in its condensed form. Inevitably, the brief and incomplete treatment of the cultural climate in the Ukraine leads to oversimplification. By devoting so much space to the activities of the Ukrainian underground movement, the study neglects the wider problems of Ukrainian intellectual life. The book is carefully edited, with only a few errors in transliteration. That it can be read with interest by a non-specialist adds greatly to its value.

GEORGE S. N. LUCKYJ
University of Toronto

KORPER, RUTH. *The Candlelight Kingdom*. New York, Macmillan, 1955. 83 pp. \$2.75.

Among the millions of refugees thrust abroad by the 1917 Russian Revolution was the family of Dr. Michael Zernoff, a Moscow physician. Surviving the terrors of Black Sea evacuation and hunger in Constantinople, the family settled in hospitable Belgrade, where the two sons and two daughters entered the University. There, under the profound impression of the Revolution, these students came together with others like them in a "circle" to seek for any possible explanation and meaning of these catastrophic events in terms of Russian history and their own personal lives. Already faithful believers in the Orthodox Church, they began to find even deeper significance and greater help in the traditions, the teachings and the worship of the Church. This circle joined with others similarly formed in other European centers of Russian refugee life to form the Russian Student Christian Movement abroad—a student movement whose dynamic center was not Bible study or the cult of Christian action, but Orthodox Church worship and extension of Church-like influence—the "Churchification of life."

For thirty years now this impetus has been at work, being largely responsible for the establishment of St. Sergius Theological Academy in Paris, the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius, an organized dialectical experience between Anglican and Orthodox, and the participation of Russian Orthodox in the Ecumenic Movement.

The Zernoffs had a part in the inauguration of all these ventures. Nicholas, the older brother, studied at Oxford, became secretary of the Fellowship, and later accepted a lectureship at Oxford. Here his students gain the fruit of his researches (he has an Oxford Ph.D.) but also that which is most precious, his experience of the living and stimulating quality of the faith of the Eastern Orthodox Church. His own friendly and dynamic personality, like that of all the Zernoffs, transcends even his knowledge and his experience, and imposes itself on those who come to his lectures.

Mrs. Korper's book is a fruit of her listening to Dr. Zernoff's lectures, broadened and enriched by reading and attendance at Russian Orthodox Church services in Oxford and London. She has been captivated by the experience, and like others who have had a unique experience, she has felt it her duty to share it with others. She deals with history, doctrine and worship, but chiefly she tries to tell the thoughts welling up in her own mind and soul as a result of this experience. Some people will find the book very stimulating, others may be confused, partly because the author's experience has not reached the clarity of maturity, but on the whole, the book is a contribution to a subject which is increasingly claiming the attention of seekers after understanding between the soul-lifted peoples of the East and the pew-sitting people of the West.

PAUL B. ANDERSON

New York City

VOYCE, ARTHUR. *The Moscow Kremlin. Its History, Architecture, and Art Treasures.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1954. 111 plates, 10 text figures. \$10.00.

The volume under review is the first of its kind in English, and it accomplishes its purpose, which is to make the splendid Russian citadel understandable by giving a readable illustrated précis of the historical events and personages of which it has been the scene, a résumé of the successive stages in its construction, and an account of the treasures accumulated within it. The author writes from personal experience, and this reviewer, who was permitted to visit the Kremlin briefly in 1935, feels that the book gives an authentic and well-rounded impression of this great ensemble. The book is attractive in design, easy to read, and pleasant to handle.

As was inevitable, no fresh photographs were obtained through the Iron Curtain. The plates in the book are, however, well chosen and well reproduced from older material, including published heliotypes, painstaking old lithographs, old engravings, and measured drawings. The wide range of sources from which these reproductions come is accessible to only a few, and the author has performed a service in bringing the pictures together here. The only complaint is that the book lacks a clear general plan of the Kremlin. The remarkable Godunov engraving of 1610 serves as end papers, but the most interesting part is pinched into the binding, and the five other plans are so much reduced that their inscriptions—in Latin and *Cyrilitsa*—are microscopic or utterly illegible. While this will trouble specialists,

it is not a grave defect in the case of the ordinary reader.

With pleasure one follows the author's consideration of the site, the historical background (actually a useful primer of Russian history), and the Italian constructions (c. 1475-1530), including fortifications, palaces, and two of the Kremlin cathedrals—all later given a strong Russian imprint. The chapter on Art Treasures shows, almost as in a laboratory, how Byzantine, Oriental, and Western elements were fused by the Russians in creating their own style. The last chapter of the book deals with Red Square, which adjoins the Kremlin on the

landward side. This interesting chapter gives an excellent idea of the genesis, form, and development of the "Fairy Tale Church" dedicated to Basil the Blessed. Appendices deal with the illustrations (a catalogue *raisonné*), chronology, interesting details given as notes on the text, and bibliography. There is an index. Readers who have preserved the recent color section of *Life* on the vanished splendor of Russia will do well to consider it a supplement to Mr. Voyce's excellent volume.

KENNETH JOHN CONANT

Harvard University

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
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